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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is two-fold. First, we develop the measurement the-
ory of polarization for the case in which income distributions can be described
using density functions. Second, we provide sample estimators of population po-
larization indices that can be used to compare polarization across time or entities.
Distribution-freestatisticalinferenceresultsarealsoderivedinordertoensurethat
the orderings of polarization across entities are not simply due to sampling noise.
An illustration of the use of these tools using data from 21 countries shows that
polarization and inequality orderings can often differ in practice.
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1. Introduction
Initiated by Esteban and Ray (1991, 1994), Foster and Wolfson (1992) and Wolf-
son (1994), there has been a recent upsurge of interest in the measurement of po-
larization
1 and in the use of such measures as a correlate of different aspects of
socioeconomic performance. It seems fairly widely accepted that polarization is a
concept that is distinct from inequality, and that — at least in principle — it could
be connected with several aspects of social, economic and political change.
2
Following Esteban and Ray (1991, 1994), we rely almost exclusively on what
might be called the identiﬁcation-alienation framework. The idea is simple: po-
larization is related to the alienation that individuals and groups feel from one
another, but such alienation is fuelled by notions of within-group identity. In concen-
trating on such phenomena, we do not mean to suggest that instances in which
a single isolated individual runs amok with a machine gun are rare, or that they
are unimportant in the larger scheme of things. Rather, these are not the objects
of our enquiry. We are interested in the correlates of organized, large-scale social
unrest — strikes, demonstrations, processions, widespread violence, and revolt or
rebellion. Such phenomena thrive on differences, to be sure. But they cannot exist
without notions of group identity either.
This brief discussion immediately suggests that inequality, inasmuch as it con-
cernsitselfwithinterpersonalalienation,capturesbutoneaspectofpolarization. To
be sure, there are some obvious changes that would be branded as both inequality-
and polarization-enhancing. For instance, if two income groups are further sepa-
ratedbyincreasingeconomicdistance, inequalityandpolarizationwouldpresum-
ably both increase. However, local equalizations of income differences at two dif-
ferent ranges of the income distribution will most likely lead to two better-deﬁned
groups — each with a clearer sense of itself and the other. In this case, inequality
will have come down but polarization may be on the rise.
The purpose of this paper is two-fold. First, we develop the measurement the-
ory of polarization for the case in which the relevant distributions can be described
by density functions. There are many such instances, the most important being
income, consumption and wealth – regrouped under “income" for short. The rea-
son for doing so is simple: with sample data aggregated along income intervals,
it is unclear how to provide a statistically satisfactory account of whether dis-
tributive measures (based on such data) are signiﬁcantly different across time or
entities. Indeed, a rapidly burgeoning literature on the statistics of inequality and
poverty measurement shows how to construct appropriate statistical tests for such
measures using disaggregated data (see, e.g., Beach and Davidson, (1983), Beach
and Richmond (1985), Bishop et al. (1989), Kakwani (1993), Anderson (1996), and
1See Esteban and Ray (1991, 1994), Foster and Wolfson (1992), Wolfson (1994, 1997), Alesina and
Spolaore (1997), Quah (1997), Wang and Tsui (2000), Esteban, Grad´ in and Ray (1998), Chakravarty and
Majumder (2001), Zhang and Kanbur (2001) and Rodr´ iguez and Salas (2002).
2See, for instance, D’Ambrosio and Wolff (2001), Collier and Hoefﬂer (2001), Fajnzylber, Lederman
andLoayza(2000),Garcia-MontalvoandReynal-Querol(2002),Grad´ in(2000),KnackandKeefer(2001),
Milanovic (2000), Quah (1997) and Reynal-Querol (2002). See also Esteban and Ray (1999) for a formal
analysis of the connections between polarization and the equilibrium level of conﬂict in a model of
strategic interaction.2
Davidson and Duclos (1997, 2000)). A rigorous axiomatic development of the po-
larization concept in the “density case" is then a prerequisite for proper statistical
examination of polarization.
In this paper we concentrate on the axiomatics and estimation of “pure income
polarization”,thatis,ofindicesofpolarizationforwhichindividualsidentifythem-
selves only with those with similar income levels. This brings us to the second,
predominantly statistical, issue of how the estimation of polarization is to be con-
ducted. The main problem is how to estimate the size of the groups to which
individuals belong. Again, using arbitrary income intervals would appear some-
what unsatisfactory. Instead, we estimate group size non-parametrically using
kernel density procedures. A natural estimator of the polarization indices is then
given by substituting the distribution function by the empirical distribution func-
tion. Assuming that we are using a random sample of independently and iden-
tically distributed observations of income, we show that the resulting estimator
has a limiting normal distribution with parameters that can be estimated free of
assumptions on the true (but unknown) distribution of incomes. Distribution-free
statistical inference can then be applied to ensure that the orderings of polarization
across entities are not simply due to sampling noise.
Itisusefultolocatethispaperinthecontextoftheearlierstepinthemeasurement
ofpolarizationinEstebanandRay(1994)—ERfromnowon. Themeasurederived
inERwasbasedonadiscrete,ﬁnitesetofincomegroupingslocatedinacontinuous
ambient space of possible income values. This generated two major problems, one
conceptual and the other practical. At the conceptual level we have the drawback
that the measure presents an unpleasant discontinuity. This is precisely due to
the fact that ER is based on a population distributed over a discrete and distinct
numberofpoints.
3 Thepracticaldifﬁcultyisthatthepopulationisassumedtohave
already been bunched in the relevant groups. This feature rendered the measure of
little use for many interesting problems.
4 As mentioned above, the present paper
addresses both problems and provides what we hope is a useable measure.
Inaddition, themainaxiomsthatweusetocharacterizeincomepolarizationare
substantiallydifferentfromER(thoughtheyaresimilarinspirit). Inlargepart, this
is due to the fact that we are dealing with a completely different domain (spaces
of densities). We therefore ﬁnd it of interest that these new axioms end up charac-
terizing a measure of polarization that turns out to be the natural extension of ER
to the case of continuous distributions. At a deeper level, there are, however, im-
portant differences, such as the different bounds on the “polarization-sensitivity”
parameter α that are obtained.
InSection2weaxiomaticallycharacterizeameasureofpureincomepolarization
and examine its properties. In Section 3, we turn to estimation and inference issues
for polarization measures. In Section 4 , we illustrate the axiomatic and statistical
results using data drawn from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) data sets for
21 countries. We compute the Gini coefﬁcient and the polarization measure for
these countries for years in Wave 3 (1989–1992) and Wave 4 (1994–1997), and show
that the two indices furnish distinct information on the shape of the distributions.
3ER (Section 4, p. 846) mention this problem.
4In Esteban, Grad´ in and Ray (1998) we presented a statistically reasonable way to bunch the popu-
lation in groups and thus make the ER measure operational. Yet, the number of groups had to be taken
as exogenous and the procedure altogether had no clear efﬁciency properties.3
Section 5 summarizes the results and discusses an important extension. All proofs
are in Section 6.
2. Measuring Income Polarization
Thepurposeofthissectionistoproceedtowardsafullaxiomatizationofincome
polarization.
2.1. Starting Point. The domain under consideration is the class of all continu-
ous (unnormalized) densities in I R+, with their integrals corresponding to various
population sizes. Let f be such a density. An individual located at income x is pre-
sumed to feel a sense of identiﬁcation that depends on the density at x, f(x). More
generally, one might consider the possibility that individuals have a nondegener-
ate “window of identiﬁcation". However, the foundations for the width of such an
identiﬁcation window appear unclear. We have therefore opted for deﬁning our
familyofpolarizationmeasuresforthelimitcasewhenthewindowwidthbecomes
zero. The discussion in Section 2.4.4 makes this last statement more precise.
An individual located at x feels alienation |x−y| as far as an individual located
at y is concerned. As in ER, we write the effective antagonism of x towards y (under
f) as some nonnegative function
T(i,a),
where i = f(x) and a = |x − y|. It is assumed that T is increasing in its second
argument and that T(0,a)=T(i,0 )=0 , just as in ER. We take polarization to be
proportional to the “sum" of all effective antagonisms:
(1) P(F)=
  
T (f(x),|x − y|)f(x)f(y)dxdy,
This class of measures is neither very useful nor operational. In particular, much
depends on the choice of the functional form T. In what follows, we place axioms
on this starting point so as to pin down this functional form.
2.2. Axioms.
2.2.1. Densities and Basic Operations. Our axioms will largely be based on domains
thatareunionsofoneormoreverysimpledensitiesf thatwewillcallbasicdensities.
These are unnormalized (by population), are symmetric and unimodal, and have
compact support.
5
Tobesure,f canbepopulationrescaledtoanypopulationpbysimplymultiplying
f pointwise by p to arrive at a new distribution pf (unnormalized). Likewise, f
can undergo a slide.A slide to the right by x is just a new density g such that
g(y)=f(y − x). Likewise for a slide to the left. And f with mean µ  can be income
rescaled to any new mean µ that we please as follows: g(x)=( µ /µ)f(xµ /µ) for
all x.
6 These operations maintain symmetry and unimodality and therefore keep
us within the class of basic densities.
5By symmetry we mean that f(m − x)=f(m + x) for all x ∈ [0,m], where m is the mean and by
unimodality we mean that f is nondecreasing on [0,m].
6The reason for this particular formulation is best seen by examining the corresponding cumula-
tive distribution functions, which must satisfy the property that G(x)=F(xµ /µ), and then taking
derivatives.4
If we think of slides and scalings as inducing a partition of the basic densities,
each collection of basic densities in the same element of the partition may be asso-
ciated with a root, a basic density with mean 1 and support [0,2], with population
size set to unity. That is, one can transform any basic density to its root by a set
of scalings and slides. [This concept will be important both in the axioms as well
as in the main proof.] Two distinct roots differ in “shape", a quality that cannot be
transformed by the above operations.
Finally,weshallalsousetheconceptofasqueeze,deﬁnedasfollows. Letf beany
basic density with mean µ and let λ lie in (0,1].Aλ-squeeze of f is a transformation
as follows:
(2) fλ(x) ≡
1
λ
f
 
x − [1 − λ]µ
λ
 
.
A(λ-) squeeze is, in words, a very special sort of mean-preserving reduction in the
spread of f. It concentrates more weight on the global mean of the distribution, as
opposed to what would be achieved, say, with a progressive Dalton transfer on the
same side of the mean. Thus a squeeze truly collapses a density inwards towards
its global mean. The following properties can be formally established.
[P.1] For each λ ∈ (0,1), fλ is a density.
[P.2] For each λ ∈ (0,1), fλ has the same mean as f.
[P.3] If 0 <λ<λ
  < 1, then fλ second-order stochastically dominates fλ

.
[P.4] As λ ↓ 0, fλ converges weakly to the degenerate measure granting all weight
to µ.
Noticethatthereisnothinginthedeﬁnitionthatrequiresasqueezetobeapplied
to symmetric unimodal densities with compact support. In principle, a squeeze as
deﬁned could be applied to any density. However, the axioms to be placed below
acquire additional cogency when limited to such densities.
2.2.2. Statement of the Axioms. We will impose four axioms on the polarization
measure.
Axiom 1. If a distribution is composed of a single basic density, then a squeeze of
that density cannot increase polarization.
Axiom 1 is self-evident. A squeeze, as deﬁned here, corresponds to a global
compression of any basic density. If only one of these makes up the distribution
(see Figure 1), then the distribution is globally compressed and we must associate
this with no higher polarization. Viewed in the context of our background model,
however, it is clear that Axiom 1 is going to generate some interesting restrictions.
This is because a squeeze creates a reduction in inter-individual alienation but
also serves to raise identiﬁcation for a positive measure of agents — those located
“centrally" in the distribution. The implied restriction is, then, that the latter’s
positive impact on polarization must be counterbalanced by the former’s negative
impact.
Our next axiom considers an initial situation (see Figure 2) composed of three
disjoint densities all sharing the same root. The situation is completely symmetric,
with densities 1 and 3 having the same total population and with density 2 exactly
midway between densities 1 and 3.5
Income
Figure 1: ASingle Squeeze Cannot Increase Polarization.
Axiom 2. If a symmetric distribution is composed of three basic densities with the
same root and mutually disjoint supports, then a symmetric squeeze of the side
densities cannot reduce polarization.
In some sense, this is the deﬁning axiom of polarization. This is precisely what
we used to motivate the concept. Notice that this axiom argues that a particular
“local" squeeze (as opposed to the “global" squeeze of the entire distribution in
Axiom 1) must not bring down polarization. At this stage there is an explicit
departure from inequality measurement.
Ourthirdaxiomconsidersasymmetricdistributioncomposedoffour basicden-
sities, once again all sharing the same root.
Axiom 3. Consider a symmetric distribution composed of four basic densities with
the same root and mutually disjoint supports, as in Figure 3. Slide the two middle
densities to the side as shown (keeping all supports disjoint). Then polarization
must go up.
Our ﬁnal axiom is a simple population-invariance principle. It states that if one
situation exhibits greater polarization than another, it must continue to do so when
populations in both situations are scaled up or down by the same amount, leaving
all (relative) distributions unchanged.6
Income
Figure 2: ADouble Squeeze Cannot Lower Polarization.
Axiom 4. If P(F) ≥ P(G) and p>0, then P(pF) ≥ P(pG), where pF and pG
represent (identical) population scalings of F and G respectively.
2.3. Characterization Theorem.
Theorem 1. A measure P, as described in (1), satisﬁes Axioms 1–4 if and only if it is
proportional to
(3) Pα(f) ≡
  
f(x)1+αf(y)|y − x|dydx,
where α ∈ [0.25,1].
2.4. Discussion. Several aspects of this theorem require extended discussion.
2.4.1. Scaling . Theorem 1 states that a measure of polarization satisfying the pre-
ceding four axioms has to be proportional to the measure we have characterized.
We may wish to exploit this degree of freedom to make the polarization measure
scale-free. Homogeneity of degree zero can be achieved, if desired, by multiplying
Pα(F) by µα−1, where µ is mean income. It is easy to see that this procedure is
equivalent to one in which all incomes are normalized by their mean, and (3) is
subsequently applied.7
Income
Figure 3: A“Symmetric Outward Slide” Must Raise Polarization.
2.4.2. Importance of the IA Structure. The theorem represents a particularly sharp
characterization of the class of polarization measures that satisfy both the axioms
we have imposed and the IA structure. It must be emphasized that both these
factors play a role in pinning down our functional form. In fact, it can be checked
that several other measures of polarization satisfy Axioms 1–4, though we omit
this discussion for the sake of brevity. The IAframework is, therefore, an essential
part of the argument.
2.4.3. Partial Ordering. At the same time, and despite the sharpness of the func-
tional form, notice that we do not obtain a complete ordering for polarization, nor
do we attempt to do this.
7 Arange of values of α is entertained in the theorem. The
union of the complete orderings generated by each value gives us a partial order
for polarization. Pinning down this order completely is an open question.
2.4.4. Identiﬁcation Windows. We now turn to a discussion of our choice of basing
identiﬁcation on the point density. We may more generally suppose that individ-
uals possess a “window of identiﬁcation” as in ER, section 4. Individuals within
this window would be considered “similar” — possibly with weights decreasing
7Indeed,itispossibletoimposeadditionalrequirements(alongthelinesexploredbyER,forinstance)
to place narrower bounds on α. But we do not consider this necessarily desirable. For instance, the
uppervalueα =1hasthepropertythatallλ-squeezesofanydistributionleavepolarizationunchanged.
We do not feel that a satisfactory measure must possess this feature. This is the reason we are more
comfortable with a possible range of acceptable values for α.8
withthedistance—andwouldcontributetoasenseofgroupidentity. Atthesame
time, individuals would feel alienated only from those outside the window. Thus,
broadening one’s window of identiﬁcation has two effects. First, it includes more
neighbors when computing one’s sense of identiﬁcation. Second, it reduces one’s
sense of distance with respect to aliens — because the width of the identiﬁcation
window affects the “starting point” for alienation.
These two effects can be simultaneously captured in our seemingly narrower
model. Let t be some parameter representing the “breadth" in identiﬁcation. Sup-
posethatthismeansthateachindividualxwillconsideranindividualwithincome
y to be at the point (1 − t)x + ty. [Thus t is inversely proportional to “breadth".]
The “perceived density" of y from the vantage point of an individual located at x
is then
1
t
f
 
y − (1 − t)x
t
 
so that if t<1, the sense of identiﬁcation is generally heightened (simply set x = y
above). Thus a small value of t stands for greater identiﬁcation.
Itcanbeeasilyshownthatthepolarizationmeasureresultingfromthisextended
notionofidentiﬁcationisproportionaltoourmeasurebythefactort1−α. Therefore,
broadeningthesenseofidentiﬁcationsimplyamountstoare-scalingofthemeasure
deﬁnedforthelimitcaseinwhichoneisidentiﬁedwithindividualshavingexactly
the same income.
It is also possible to directly base identiﬁcation on the average density over a
non-degenerate window. It can be shown that when our polarization measure
is rewritten to incorporate this notion of identiﬁcation, it converges precisely to
the measure in Theorem 1 as the size of the window converges to zero. Thus
an alternative view of point-identiﬁcation is that it is a robust approximation to
“narrow” identiﬁcation windows.
2.4.5. Asymmetric Alienation. In ER we already pointed out that in some environ-
ments our implicit hypothesis of a symmetric sense of alienation might not be ap-
propriate. Itcanbearguedthatwhileindividualsmayfeelalienatedwithrespectto
those with higher income or wealth, such sentiments need not be reciprocated. For
the extreme case of purely one-sided alienation the appropriate extension would
be
Pα(f) ≡
 
f(x)1+α
 
x
f(y)(y − x)dydx.
[This is not to say that we have axiomatized such an extension.]
2.4.6. Remarks on the Proof, and the Derived Bounds on α. The proof of Theorem 1 is
longandinvolved,soabriefroadmapmaybeusefulhere. Theﬁrsthalfoftheproof
shows that our axioms imply (3), along with the asserted bounds on α. We begin
by noting that the function T must be (weakly) concave in alienation (Lemmas 1
and2). Axiom2yieldsthis. YetbyLemmas3and4(whichcentrallyemployAxiom
3), T must be (weakly) convex as well. These two assertions must imply that T
is linear in alienation, and so is of the form T(i,a)=φ(i)a for some function φ.
(Lemma 4 again). Lemma 5 completes the derivation of our functional form by
using the population invariance principle (Axiom 4) to argue that φ must exhibit
constant elasticity.9
Our measure bears an interesting resemblance to the Gini coefﬁcient. Indeed,
if α =0 , the measure is the Gini coefﬁcient. However, our arguments ensure that
not only is α>0, it cannot go below some uniformly positive lower bound, which
happenstobe0.25. Where,intheaxiomsandintheIAstructure,doessuchabound
lurk? To appreciate this, consider Axiom 2, which refers to a double-squeeze of
two “side" basic densities. Such squeezes bring down internal alienations in each
component density. Yet the axiom demands that overall polarization not fall. It
follows, therefore, that the increased identiﬁcations created by the squeeze must
outweigh the decreased within-component alienation. This restricts α. It cannot
be too low.
Byasimilartoken,αcannotbetoohigheither. ThebiteherecomesfromAxiom1,
whichdecreesthatasinglesqueeze(inanenvironmentwherethereisjustonebasic
component) cannot increase polarization. Once again, alienation comes down and
someidentiﬁcationsgoup(asthesinglesqueezeoccurs), butthistimewewantthe
decline in alienation to dominate the proceedings. This is tantamount to an upper
bound on α.
8
The above arguments are made using Lemmas 6 and 7, which also begin the
proof that the axioms are implied by our class of measures. The various steps for
this direction of the proof, which essentially consist in verifying the axioms, are
completed in Lemmas 8 through 11.
The approach to our characterization bears a superﬁcial similarity to ER. Actu-
ally, the axioms are similar in spirit, dealing as they do in each case with issues of
identiﬁcation and alienation. However, their speciﬁc structure is fundamentally
different. This is because our axioms strongly exploit the density structure of the
model (in ER there are only discrete groupings). In turn, this creates basic dif-
ferences in the method of proof. It is comforting that the two approaches yield
the same functional characterization in the end, albeit with different numerical
restrictions on the value of α.
2.5. ComparingDistributions. Thefundamentalhypothesisunderlyingallofour
analysis is that polarization is driven by the interplay of two forces: identiﬁcation
withone’sowngroupandalienationvis-a-visothers. Ouraxiomsyieldaparticular
functional form to the interaction between these two forces. When comparing
two distributions, which should we expect to display the greater polarization?
Our informal answer is that this should depend on the separate contributions of
alienation and identiﬁcation and on their joint co-movement. Increased alienation
is associated with an increase in income distances. Increased identiﬁcation would
manifest itself in a sharper deﬁnition of groups, i.e., the already highly populated
points in the distribution becoming even more populated at the expense of the
less populated. Such a change would produce an increase in the variability of the
densityoverthesupportofthedistribution. Finally,whentakenjointly,theseeffects
may reinforce each other in the sense that alienation may be highest at the incomes
that have experienced an increase in identiﬁcation, or they may counterbalance
each other.
8Onemightask: whydotheargumentsinthisparagraphandtheonejustbeforeleadto“compatible"
thresholds for α? The reason is this: in the double-squeeze, there are cross-group alienations as well
which permit a given increase in identiﬁcation to have a stronger impact on polarization. Therefore the
required threshold on α is smaller in this case.10
To be sure, it is not possible to move these three factors around independently.
After all, one density describes the income distribution and the three factors we
have mentioned are byproducts of that density. Nevertheless, thinking in this
way develops some intuition for polarization, which we will try and put to use in
Sections 4.1 and 4.2.
To pursue this line of reasoning, ﬁrst normalize all incomes by their mean to
make the results scale free. Fix a particular value of α, as given by Theorem 1.
[More on this parameter below.] The α-identiﬁcation at income y, denoted by ια(y),
is measured by f(y)α. Hence, the average α-identiﬁcation¯ ι is deﬁned by
(4) ¯ ια ≡
 
f(y)αdF(y)=
 
f(y)1+αdy.
Thealienationbetweentwoindividualswithincomesy andxisgivenby|y−x|.
Therefore, the overall alienation felt by an individual with income y, a(y),i s
(5) a(y)=
 
|y − x|dF(x)
and the average alienation ¯ a is
(6) ¯ a =
 
a(y)dF(y)=
  
|y − x|dF(x)dF(y).
[Notice that ¯ a is twice the Gini coefﬁcient.] Now conduct a completely routine
exercise. Deﬁneρasthenormalizedcovariancebetweenidentiﬁcationandalienation:
ρ ≡ covια,a/¯ ια¯ a. Then
ρ ≡
covια,a
¯ ια¯ a
=
1
¯ ια¯ a
 
[ια(y) −¯ ια][a(y) − ¯ a]f(y)dy
=
1
¯ ια¯ a
  
f(y)1+αa(y)dy − ¯ a¯ ια
 
=
Pα(f)
¯ ια¯ a
− 1,
so that
(7) Pα(f)=¯ a¯ ια [1 + ρ]
This is a more precise statement of the informal idea expressed at the start of this
section.
There is one dimension, however, along which this decomposition lacks intu-
ition. Itisthatα unavoidablyentersintoit: wemakethisexplicitbyusingtheterm
α-identiﬁcation (though we will resort to “identiﬁcation" when there is little risk of
confusion). This sort of identiﬁcation is not intrinsic to the density. Yet the formula
itself is useful, for it tells us that — all other things being equal — greater variability
in the density is likely to translate into greater polarization for that density, this
effect making itself felt more strongly when α is larger. The reason is simple: the
main ingredient for α-identiﬁcation is the function x1+α (see (4)), which is a strictly
convex function of x.
Greater variability of density is reminiscent of multimodality, and therefore ties
in with our graphical intuitions regarding polarization. We reiterate, however,
that this is only one factor of several, and that often it may not be possible to
change this factor in the direction of higher polarization without infringing the11
ceteris paribus qualiﬁcation.
9 Nevertheless, the observation may be helpful in some
situations,andwewillinvokeitintheempiricaldiscussionofSection4.2. Indeed,in
unimodal situations (which present the most subtle problems as far as polarization
is concerned), these factors can act as guides to simple visual inspection.
3. Estimation and Inference
We now turn to estimation issues regarding Pα(F), and associated questions of
statistical inference.
3.1. Estimating Pα(F). The following rewriting of Pα(F) will be useful:
Observation 1. For every distribution function F with associated density f and mean µ,
(8) Pα(F)=
 
y
f(y)αa(y)dF(y) ≡
 
y
pα(y)dF(y),
with a(y) ≡ µ + y (2F(y) − 1) − 2µ∗(y), where µ∗(y)=
  y
−∞ xdF(x) is a partial mean
and where pα(y)=f(y)αa(y).
Suppose that we wish to estimate Pα(F) using a random sample of n iid obser-
vations of income yi, i =1 ,...,n, drawn from the distribution F(y) and ordered
such that y1 ≤ y2 ≤ ... ≤ yn . A natural estimator of Pα(F) is Pα( ˆ F), given by
substituting the distribution function F(y) by the empirical distribution function
  F(y), by replacing f(y)α by a suitable estimator   f(y)α (to be examined below), and
by replacing a(y) by   a(y). Hence, we have
(9) Pα(  F)=
 
  f(y)α  a(y)d  F(y)=n−1
n  
i=1
  f(yi)α  a(yi),
with the corresponding   pα(yi)=  f(yi)α  a(yi). Note that yi is the empirical quantile
for percentiles between (i − 1)/n and i/n. Hence, we may use
(10)   F(yi)=
1
2
 
(i − 1)
n
+
(i)
n
 
=0 .5n−1 (2i − 1)
and
(11)   µ
∗(yi)=n−1


i−1  
j=1
yj +
i − (i − 1)
2
yi

,
and thus deﬁne   a(yi) as
(12)   a(yi)=  µ + yi
 
n−1 (2i − 1) − 1
 
− n−1

2
i−1  
j=1
yj + yi

.
where   µ is the sample mean.
Wehavenotyetdiscussedtheestimator   f(y)α,butwilldosopresently. Observe,
however, that adding an exact replication of the sample to the original sample
should not change the value of the estimator Pα(  F). Indeed, presuming that the
9As an example: greater variability can be achieved by throwing in several local modes, but multi-
modality per se does not indicate higher polarization. There is no contradiction, however, because the
existence of several modes may also bring average alienation down relative to the bimodal case (for
instance).12
estimators   f(·)α are invariant to sample size, this is indeed the case when formulae
(9) and (12) are used. We record this formally as
Observation 2. Let y =( y1,y 2,...,yn) and ˜ y =( ˜ y1, ˜ y2,..., ˜ y2n) be two vectors of sizes
n and 2n respectively, ordered along increasing values of income. Suppose that for each
i ∈{ 1,...,n}, yi =˜ y2i−1 =˜ y2i for all i =1 ,...,n. Let Pα(Fy) be the polarization index
deﬁned by (9) and (12) for a vector of income y. Then, provided that fy(yi)=f˜ y(yi) for
i =1 ,...,n, it must be that Pα(Fy)=Pα(F˜ y).
Remark. We may call this feature (sample) population-invariance.
10 When obser-
vations are weighted (or “grouped”), with wi being the sampling weight on obser-
vation i and with w =
 n
j=1 wj being the sum of weights, a population-invariant
deﬁnition of   g(yi) is then:
(13)   a(yi)=  µ + yi

w−1

2
i  
j=1
wj − wi

 − 1

 − w−1

2
i−1  
j=1
wjyj + wiyi

.
(12) is a special case of (13) obtained when wi =1for all i. For analytical simplicity,
we focus below on the case of samples with unweighted iid observations.
3.2. f(yi)α andtheSamplingDistributionofPα(  F). Itwillbegenerallydesirable
to adjust our estimator of f(yi)α to sample size in order to minimize the sampling
errorofestimatingthepolarizationindices. Tofacilitateamoredetaileddiscussion
of this issue, ﬁrst decompose the estimator Pα(  F) across its separate sources of
sampling variability:
Pα(  F) − Pα(F)=
 
(  pα(y) − pα(y))dF(y)+
 
pα(y)d(  F − F)(y)
+
 
(  pα(y) − pα(y))d(  F − F)(y). (14)
The ﬁrst source of variation,   pα(y)−pα(y), comes from the sampling error made in
estimating the identiﬁcation and the alienation effects at each point y in the income
distribution. It can be decomposed further as:
  pα(y) − pα(y)=
 
  f(y)α − f(y)α
 
a(y)+f(y)α (  a(y) − a(y))
+
 
  f(y)α − f(y)α
 
(  a(y) − a(y)). (15)
As can be seen by inspection,   a(y) − a(y) is of order O(n−1/2) . Assuming that
  f(y)α − f(y)α vanishes as n tends to inﬁnity (as will be shown in the proof of
Theorem 2), the last term in (15) is of lower order than the others and can therefore
be ignored asymptotically.
10It is not to be confused with the conceptual discussion of what happens to polarization if the true
population size is changed (and not that of the sample).13
This argument also shows that   pα(y) − pα(y) ∼ o(1). Because F(y) −   F(y)=
O(n−1/2), the last term in (14) is of order o(n−1/2) and can also be ignored. Com-
bining (14) and (15), we thus see that for large n,
Pα(  F) − Pα(F) ∼ =
   
  f(y)α − f(y)α
 
a(y)dF(y) (16)
+
 
f(y)α (  a(y) − a(y))dF(y) (17)
+
 
pα(y)d(  F − F)(y). (18)
The terms (17) and (18) are further developed in the proof of Theorem 2 in the
appendix.
We thus turn to the estimation of f(y)α in (16), which we propose to do non-
parametricallyusingkerneldensityestimation
11. ThisusesakernelfunctionK(u),
deﬁned such that
  ∞
−∞ K(u)du =1(this guarantees the desired property that
  ∞
−∞
  f(y)dy =1 )andK(u) ≥ 0(thisguaranteesthat   f(y) ≥ 0). Itisalsoconvenient
to choose a kernel function that is symmetric around 0, with
 
uK(u)du =0and  
u2K(u)du = σ2
K < ∞. The estimator   f(y) is then deﬁned as
(19)   f(y) ≡ n−1
n  
i=1
Kh (y − yi),
where Kh (z) ≡ h−1K (z/h). The parameter h is usually referred to as the band-
width (or window width, or smoothing parameter). For simplicity, we assume it
to be invariant across y, though we discuss later how it should optimally be set
as a function of sample size. One kernel function that has nice continuity and
differentiability properties is the Gaussian kernel, deﬁned by
(20) K(u)=( 2 π)
−0.5 exp−0.5u
2
,
a form that we will use later for illustrative purposes.
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Withf(y)α estimatedaccordingtothisgeneraltechnique,wehavethefollowing
theorem on the asymptotic sampling distribution of   Pα.
Theorem2. Assumethattheorder-2populationmomentsofy,pα(y),f(y)α,
  y
−∞ zf(z)αdF(z)
and y
  y
−∞ f(z)αdF(z) are ﬁnite. Let h in Kh(·) vanish as n tends to inﬁnity. Then
n0.5
 
Pα(  F) − Pα(F)
 
has a limiting normal distribution N(0,V α), with
(21) Vα =var
f(y)
(vα(y)),
where
(22) vα(y)=( 1+α)pα(y)+y
 
f(x)αdF(x)+2
  ∞
y
(x − y)f(x)αdF(x).
Observe that the assertion of Theorem 2 is distribution-free since everything in
(21) can be estimated consistently without having to specify the population distri-
butionfromwhichthesampleisdrawn. Pα(  F)isthusaroot-nconsistentestimator
11The literature on kernel density estimation is large – see for instance Silverman (1986), H¨ ardle
(1990) and Pagan and Ullah (1999) for an introduction to it.
12Note that the Gaussian kernel has the property that σ2
K =1 .14
ofPα(F),unliketheusualnon-parametricdensityandregressionestimatorswhich
are often n2/5 consistent. The strength of Theorem 2 also lies in the fact that so long
as h tends to vanish as n increases, the precise path taken by h has a negligible
inﬂuence on the asymptotic variance since it does not appear in (21).
3.3. The Minimization of Sampling Error. In ﬁnite samples, however, Pα(  F) is
biased. The bias arises from the smoothing techniques employed in the estimation
ofthedensityfunctionf(y). Inaddition, theﬁnite-samplevarianceofPα(  F)isalso
affected by the smoothing techniques. As is usual in the non-parametric literature,
thelargerthevalueofh, thelargertheﬁnite-samplebias, buttheloweristheﬁnite-
sample variance. We can exploit this tradeoff to choose an “optimal" bandwidth
for the estimation of Pα(  F), which we denote by h∗(n).
Acommon technique is to select h∗(n) so as to minimize the mean square error
(MSE)oftheestimator,givenasampleofsizen. Toseewhatthisentails,decompose
(foragivenh)theMSEintothesumofthesquaredbiasandofthevarianceinvolved
in estimating Pα(F):
(23) MSEh(Pα(  F)) =
 
biash
 
Pα(  F)
  2
+ varh
 
Pα(  F)
 
,
and denote by h∗(n) the value of h which minimizes MSEh(Pα(  F)). This value is
described in the following theorem:
Theorem 3. For large n, h∗(n) is given by
(24) h∗(n)=
 
−
cov(vα(y),p   
α(y))
ασ2
K
  
f  (y)pα(y)dy
 2n−0.5 + O
 
n−1 
.
It is well known that f

(y) is proportional to the bias of the estimator ˆ f(y).A
large value of ασ2
K
  
f  (y)pα(y)dy
 2
will thus necessitate a lower value of h∗(n)
in order to reduce the bias. Conversely, a larger negative correlation between
vα(y) and p  
α(y) will militate in favor of a larger h∗(n) in order to decrease the
sampling variance. More importantly, the optimal bandwidth for the estimation
of the polarization index is of order O(n−1/2), unlike the usual kernel estimators
which are of signiﬁcantly larger order O(n−1/5). Because of this, we may expect
the precise choice of h not to be overly inﬂuential on the sampling precision of
polarization estimators
13.
To compute h∗(n), two general approaches can be followed. We can assume
that f(y) is not too far from a parametric density function, such as the normal
or the log-normal, and use (24) to compute h∗(n) (for instance, in the manner of
Silverman(1986, p.45)forpointdensityestimation). Alternatively, wecanestimate
the terms in (24) directly from the empirical distribution, using an initial value of h
to compute the f(y) in the vα(y) and pα(y) functions. For both of these approaches
(and particularly for the last one), expression (24) is clearly distribution speciﬁc,
and it will also generally be very cumbersome to estimate.
It would thus seem useful to devise a "rule-of-thumb" formula that can be used
to provide a readily-computable value for h. When the true distribution is that of
13See Hall and Marron (1987) for rates of convergence of kernel density
estimation for integrals of squared derivatives of various orders.15
a normal distribution with variance σ2, and when a Gaussian kernel (see (20)) is
used to estimate ˆ f(y) , h∗ is approximately given by:
(25) h∗ ∼ = 4.7n−0.5 σα0.1.
Easily computed, this formula works well with the normal distribution
14 since
it is never farther than 5% from the h∗ that truly minimizes the MSE. The use
of such approximate rules also seems justiﬁed by the fact that the MSE of the
polarization indices does not appear to be overly sensitive to the choice of the
bandwidth h. (25) seems to perform relatively well with other distributions than
the normal, including the popular log-normal one, although this is less true when
the distribution becomes very skewed. For skewness larger than about 6, a more
robust — though more cumbersome — approximate formula for the computation
of h∗ is given by
(26) h∗ ∼ = n−0.5IQ
(3.7 6+1 4 .7σln)
( 1+1 .09 · 10−4σln)
(7268+15323α),
where IQ is the interquartile and σln is the variance of the logarithms of income –
an indicator of the skewness of the income distribution.
4. An Illustration
We illustrate our axiomatic and statistical results with data drawn from the
Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) data sets
15 on 21 countries for each of Wave 3
(1989–1992)andWave4(1994–1997). Countries,surveyyearsandabbreviationsare
listed in Table 1. [All ﬁgures and tables for this section are located at the end of the
paper.] We use household disposable income (i.e., post-tax-and-transfer income)
normalizedbyanadult-equivalencescaledeﬁnedass0.5,wheresishouseholdsize.
Observations with negative incomes are removed as well as those with incomes
exceeding50timestheaverage(thisaffectslessthan1%ofallsamples). Household
observations are weighted by the LIS sample weights times the number of persons
in the household. As discussed in Section 2.4.1, the usual homogeneity-of-degree-
zero property is imposed throughout by multiplying the indices Pα(F) by µα−1 or
equivalently by normalizing all incomes by their mean. For ease of comparison,
all indices are divided by 2, so that Pα=0(F) is the usual Gini coefﬁcient.
4.1. Results. Tables 2 and 3 show estimates of the Gini (P0) and four polarization
indices(Pα forα =0 .25,0.5,0.75,1)in21countriesforeachofthetwowaves,along
with their asymptotic standard deviations. The polarization indices are typically
ratherpreciselyestimated,withoftenonlythethirddecimaloftheestimatorsbeing
subjecttosamplingvariability. Wecanusetheseindicestocreatecountryrankings,
with a high rank corresponding to a relatively large value of the relevant index.
The tables show these rankings as well, and for each wave we display countries by
their order in the Gini ranking.
Observe that P0 and P0.25 induce very similar rankings. But considerable dif-
ferences arise between P0 and P1, or between P0.25 and P1. For instance, for Wave
14Extensive numerical simulations were made using various values of n ≥ 500 , σ and α =0 .25 to
1. The results are available from the authors upon request.
15See http://lissy.ceps.lu for detailed information on the structure of these data.16
3, the Czech Republic has the lowest Gini index of all countries, but ranks 11 in
terms of P1. Conversely, Canada,Australia and the United States exhibit high Gini
inequality, but relatively low “P1-polarization".
The Pearson and Spearman correlation matrices (showing respectively the cor-
relation across different indices and across different rankings) are shown in Table
4. Both correlation coefﬁcients fall as the distance between the α’s increases. The
lowest correlation of all — 0.6753 — is the rank correlation between the Gini index
and P1 in Wave 3. Clearly, polarization and inequality are naturally correlated, but
they are also empirically distinct in this dataset. Moreover, the extent to which in-
equalitycomparisonsresemblepolarizationcomparisonsdependontheparameter
α, which essentially captures the power of the identiﬁcation effect.
One might respond to this observation as follows: our axiomatics do not rule
out values of α very close to 0.25. Hence, in the strict sense of a partial order we
are unable to (empirically) distinguish adequately between inequality and polar-
ization, at least with the dataset at hand. In our opinion this response would be too
hasty. Our characterization not only implies a partial ordering, it provides a very
cleanpictureofhowthatorderingisparameterized, withtheparameterα havinga
deﬁniteinterpretation. Ifsubstantialvariationsinrankingoccurasαincreases,this
warrants a closer look, and certainly shows — empirically — how “large" subsets
of polarization indices work very differently from the Gini inequality index.
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Whichcountriesaremorepolarized? Toanswerthisquestion, weimplicitlyrely
on the decomposition exercise carried out in Section 2.5, in which we obtained (7),
reproduced here for convenience:
Pα =¯ a¯ ια [1 + ρ]
Tables5and6summarizetherelevantstatisticsforallWave3andWave4countries,
decomposing polarization as the product of average alienation, average identiﬁca-
tion and (one plus) the normalized covariance between the two. Consider Wave
3 with α =1 . Our ﬁrst observation is that the bulk of cross-country variation in
polarization stems from signiﬁcant variation in average identiﬁcation as well as in
average alienation. In contrast, the covariance between the two does not exhibit
similarvariationacrosscountries. Somecountries(Finland,SwedenandDenmark)
rank low both in terms in inequality and polarization, the latter despite a relatively
large level of average identiﬁcation. This is due to low average alienation. Some
countries, most strikingly Russia, Mexico, and the UK rank consistently high both
intermsininequalityandpolarization—eventhoughaverageidentiﬁcationforthe
three countries is among the lowest of all. Average alienation is very high in these
countries. Yetothercountriesshowlowinequalitybutrelativelyhighpolarization,
while others exhibit the reverse relative rankings. More on this below.
Our second observation is that, as α increases from 0.25 to 1, the cross-country
variationinthevalueofaverageα-identiﬁcationgoesup. Thisisastraightforward
implication of the densities being raised to a higher power in the measurement
of identity, as we have already pointed out in our discussion of the polarization
measure. This increase in cross-country variability produces frequent “crossings"
in the ranking of countries by polarization. Such crossings can occur at very low
16Onewouldexpectthesedistinctionstomagnifyevenfurtherfordistributionsthatarenotunimodal
(unfortunately, this exploration is not permitted by our dataset). For instance, one might use our
measures to explore the “twin-peaks" property identiﬁed by Quah (1996) for the world distribution of
income. But this is the subject of future research.17
valuesofα(below0.25)sothatforallα ∈ [0.25,1]thepolarizationrankingopposes
the inequality ranking. This is the case (for Wave 3) for Belgium-Sweden, Italy-
Canada and Israel-Australia. Crossings could — and do — occur for intermediate
values of α ∈ [0.25,1]. To be sure, they may not occur for any α ≤ 1, thus causing
the polarization ordering to coincide with the inequality ordering. This is indeed a
most frequent case for pairwise comparisons in Wave 3. Finally, in Wave 4 we also
observe “double crossings" in the cases of Canada-France and Australia-Poland.
In both cases the ﬁrst country starts with higher inequality, P0, followed by a lower
value of P0.25, but later returning to higher values for larger values of α.
Tables 7–9 summarize tests of the statistical signiﬁcance of these cross-country
rankings, so that we know which of the rankings may be reasonably attributed to
true population differences in inequality and polarization. We show the results for
Wave 3 countries, and for α =0 ,0.25 and 1. The tables display p-values for tests
that the countries listed on the rows show more inequality (Table 7) or polarization
(Tables 8 and 9) than countries on the column. Roughly speaking, these p-values
indicate the probability that an error is made when one rejects the null hypotheses
that countries on the ﬁrst row do not have a larger Pα than countries on the ﬁrst
column, in favor of the alternative hypotheses that Pα is indeed greater for the
countries on the ﬁrst row. More formally, such p-values are the maximal test sizes
that will lead to the rejection of the above null hypotheses. Using a conventional
test size of 5%, it can be seen that the majority (all those with a *, around 90%) of
the possible cross-country comparisons are statistically signiﬁcant. This is true for
all three values of α.
4.2. Discussion. It may be worth drawing out a few speciﬁc instances in more
detail. We have chosen the Czech Republic, the UK and the US (Wave 3), because
these countries illustrate well the points we have made so far.
For α =0 .25, the Czech Republic has the lowest average alienation and the
highest average α-identiﬁcation. For this value of α it is the country with the
lowest degree of polarization. Yet, for α =1 , the Czech Republic ascends to the
eleventh position in the ranking. This is to be contrasted with the US which begins
in the nineteenth position, but then slides down the rankings as α goes up, ﬁnally
equaling (and even falling slightly below) the Czech Republic. But perhaps the
most interesting relative behavior is exhibited by the US-UK pair. UK inequality
is very close to US inequality; for all intents and purposes the two have the same
GiniinWave3. Indeed, theUKrankseighteenthandtheUSnineteenth(thisisalso
true when α =0 .25). However, as α goes up to 1, the UK retains the nineteenth
position, while the US descends to ninth in the rankings.
Inwhatfollows, keepinmindthedecomposition(7). Nowobservethataverage
alienation cannot change with α, so the US-UK contrast must stem from very dif-
ferent responses of the identiﬁcation component of each country to an increase in
α. To be sure, this must mean in turn that the two densities are very different, and
indeed, Figure 6, which superimposes one density on the other, shows that they
are. The US distribution shows a remarkably ﬂat density on the interval [0.25,1.25]
of normalized incomes and so has thick tails. In contrast, the UK displays a clear
mode at y =0 .4 and thinner tails.18
CantwosuchdistributionsexhibitthesameinequalityasmeasuredbytheGini?
They certainly can, and in the US-UK case, they do.
17 Yet, while maintaining the
same average alienation, the UK density exhibits higher variability than its US
counterpart. Because — as already discussed in Section 2.5 — the identiﬁcation
function fα times the density f is strictly convex in f, the country with the greater
variation in identiﬁcation will exhibit a higher value of average identiﬁcation, with
the difference growing more pronounced as α increases. This is as it should be: control-
lingforoverallalienation,thecountrywithgreatervariationinidentiﬁcationwillbe
singled out as more polarized, and this tendency will be augmented by increases
in α. To be sure, variations in identiﬁcation ﬁnd their starkest expression when
distributions are multimodal, but even without such multimodality, variation is
possible.
The Czech-US comparison further supplements this sort of reasoning. Consult
Figure 7 in what follows. Here, the basic inequality comparison is unambiguous
(in contrast to the US-UK example): the Czech Republic has lower inequality than
the US. But the Czech Republic has a spikier density with greater variation in it.
This “shadow of multimodality" kicks in as α is increased, so much so that the
Czech Republic is actually deemed equally or more polarized than the US by the
time α =1 .
One must be careful on the following counts. We should remember that varia-
tion in identiﬁcation is only one of several factors: in particular, we do not mean
to suggest that the country with the greater variation in identiﬁcation will invari-
ably exhibit greater polarization as α → 1. For instance, our notion of a squeeze
increases the variability of identiﬁcation, but polarization must fall, by Axiom 1
(this is because alienation falls too with the squeeze). See footnote 9 for another
illustration of this point.
5. Final Remarks, and a Proposed Extension
In this paper we present and characterize a class of measures for income polar-
ization,basedonwhatwecalltheidentiﬁcation-alienationstructure. Ourapproach
is fundamentally based on the view that inter-personal alienation fuels a polarized
society, as does inequality. Our departure from inequality measurement lies in the
notionthatsuchalienationmustalsobecomplementedbyasenseofidentiﬁcation.
This combination of the two forces generates a class of measures that are sensitive
(in the same direction) to both elements of inequality and equality, depending on
where these changes are located in the overall distribution.
Ourcharacterization,andthealternativedecompositionpresentedin(7),permit
ustodescribethemeasureverysimply: foranyincomedistribution,polarizationis
the product of average alienation, average identiﬁcation, and (one plus) the mean-
normalized covariance between these two variables.
We discuss estimation issues for our measures in detail, as well as associated
questions of statistical inference.
We wish to close this paper with some remarks on what we see to be the main
conceptual task ahead. Our analysis generates a certain structure for identiﬁcation
and alienation functions in the special case in which both identiﬁcation and alienation
are based on the same characteristic. This characteristic can be income or wealth. In
17While the US distribution has ﬂatter tails, the UK distribution exhibits a signiﬁcant mode lower
than the mean income. The two effects cancel each other as far as the Gini is concerned.19
principle it could be any measurable feature with a well-deﬁned ordering. The
key restriction, however, is that whatever we choose the salient characteristic for
identiﬁcationtobe,inter-groupalienationhastobedrivenbytheverysamecharac-
teristic. Thisseemsobviousinthecasesofincomeorwealth. Yet, forsomerelevant
social characteristics this might not be a natural assumption. Think of the case of
ethnic polarization. It may or may not seem appropriate here to base inter-ethnic
alienation as only depending on some suitably deﬁned “ethnicity distance". In the
cases of socially based group identiﬁcation we ﬁnd it more compelling to adopt
a multi-dimensional approach to polarization, permitting alienation to depend on
characteristics other than the one that deﬁnes group identity. In this proposed ex-
tension, we liberally transplant our ﬁndings to the case of social polarization, but
withnofurtheraxiomaticreasoning. Inouropinion,suchreasoningisanimportant
subject of future research.
Suppose, then, that there are M “social groups", based on region, kin, ethnicity,
religion... Let nj be the number of individuals in group j, with overall population
normalized to one. Let Fj describe the distribution of income in group j (with fj
the accompanying density), unnormalized by group population. One may now
entertain a variety of “social polarization measures".
5.1. PureSocialPolarization. Consider,ﬁrst,thecaseof“puresocialpolarization”,
in which income plays no role. Assume that each person is “fully" identiﬁed with
everyothermemberofhisgroup. Likewise, thealienationfunctiontakesonvalues
that are speciﬁc to group pairs and have no reference to income. Then a natural
transplant of (3) yields the measure
(27) Ps(F)=
M  
j=1
M  
k=1
nα
j nk∆jk.
where ∆jk represents intergroup alienation. Even this sort of speciﬁcation may
be too general in some interesting instances in which individuals are interested
only in the dichotomous perception Us/They. In particular, in these instances,
individuals are not interested in differentiating between the different opposing
groups. Perhaps the simplest instance of this is a pure contest (Esteban and Ray
[1999]), which yields the variant
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(28) ˜ Ps(F)=
M  
j=1
nα
j (1 − nj).
5.2. Hybrids. Once the two extremes — pure income polarization and pure social
polarization—areidentiﬁed,wemayeasilyconsiderseveralhybrids. Asexamples,
consider the case in which notions of identiﬁcation are mediated not just by group
membership but by income similarities as well, while the antagonism equation
remainsuntouched. [Forinstance, bothlow-incomeandhigh-incomeHindusmay
feel antagonistic towards Muslims as a whole while sharing very little in common
18See Reynal-Querol [2002] for a similar analysis. D’Ambrosio and Wolff [2001] also consider a
measure of this type but with income distances across groups explicitly considered.20
with each other.] Then we get what one might call social polarization with income-
mediated identiﬁcation:
(29) Ps(F)=
M  
j=1
(1 − nj)
 
x
fj(x)αdFj(x).
Onecouldexpand(orcontract)theimportanceofincomefurther,whilestillstaying
away from the extremes. For instance, suppose that — in addition to the income-
mediation of group identity — alienation is also income-mediated (for alienation,
two individuals must belong to different groupsand have different incomes). Now
groups have only a demarcating role — they are necessary (but not sufﬁcient) for
identity, and they are necessary (but not sufﬁcient) for alienation. The resulting
measure would look like this:
(30) P∗(F)=
M  
j=1
 
k =j
 
x
 
y
fj(x)α|x − y|dFj(x)dFk(y).
Note that we do not intend to suggest that other special cases or hybrids are not
possible, or that they are less important. The discussion here is only to show that
socialandeconomicconsiderationscanbeproﬁtablycombinedinthemeasurement
of polarization. Indeed, it is conceivable that such measures will perform better
than the more commonly used fragmentation measures in the analysis of social
conﬂict. But a full exploration of this last theme must await a future paper.
6. Proofs
ProofofTheorem1. Intheﬁrsthalfoftheproof,weshowthataxioms1–4imply
(3).
Lemma 1. Let g be a continuous real-valued function deﬁned on I R such that for all x>0
and all δ with 0 <δ<x ,
(31) g(x) ≥
1
2δ
  x+δ
x−δ
g(y)dy.
Then g must be a concave function.
Proof. This is a well-known implication of Jensen’s characterization of concave
functions.
In what follows, keep in mind that the basic structure of our measure only
considers income differences across people, and not the incomes per se. Therefore
wemayslideanydistributiontotheleftorrightasweplease,withoutdisturbingthe
analysis (even negative incomes may be considered when these are expositionally
convenient).
Lemma 2. The function T must be concave in a for every i>0.
Proof. Fix x>0, some i>0, and some value of δ ∈ (0,x). Consider the following
specialization of the setting of Axiom 2. We take three basic densities as in that
Axiom(seealsoFigure1)butspecializeasshowninFigure4; eachisatransformof
a uniform basic density. The bases are centered at −x, 0 and x. The side densities
are of width 2δ and height h, and the middle density is of width 2  and height i.
In the sequel, we shall vary   and h but to make sure that Axiom 2 applies, we
choose  >0 such that δ +  <x . It is easy to check that a λ-squeeze of the side
densities simply implies that the base of the rectangle is contracted to a width 2λδ21
2ε 2δ 2δ
2λδ 2λδ
hh
h/λ h/λ
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Figure 4:
(keeping the centering unchanged), while the height is raised to h/λ. See Figure
4. For each λ, we may decompose the polarization measure (1) into ﬁve distinct
components. First, there is the “internal polarization" of the middle rectangle, call
it Pm. This component is unchanged as we change λ so there will be no need to
explicitly calculate it. Next, there is the “internal polarization" of each of the side
rectangles,callitPs. Third,thereisthetotaleffectiveantagonismfeltbyinhabitants
of the middle towards each side density. Call this Ams. Fourth, there is the total
effective antagonism felt by inhabitants of each side towards the middle. Call this
Asm. Finally, there is the total effective antagonism felt by inhabitants of one side
towards the other side. Call this Ass. Observe that each of these last four terms
appear twice, so that (writing everything as a function of λ),
(32) P(λ)=Pm +2 Ps(λ)+2 Ams(λ)+2 Asm(λ)+2 Ass(λ),
Now we compute the terms on the right hand side of (32). First,
Ps(λ)=
1
λ
2
  x+λδ
x−λδ
  x+λδ
x−λδ
T(h/λ,|b  − b|)h2db db,
where (here and in all subsequent cases) b will stand for the “origin" income (to
whichtheidentiﬁcationisapplied)andb  the“destinationincome"(towardswhich
the antagonism is felt). Next,
Ams(λ)=
1
λ
   
− 
  x+λδ
x−λδ
T(i,b  − b)ihdb db.22
Third,
Asm(λ)=
1
λ
  x+λδ
x−λδ
   
− 
T(h/λ.b − b )hidb db,
And ﬁnally,
Ass(λ)=
1
λ
2
  −x+λδ
−x−λδ
  x+λδ
x−λδ
T(h/λ,b  − b)h2db db.
The axiom requires that P(λ) ≥ P(1). Equivalently, we require that [P(λ) −
P(1)]/2h ≥ 0 for all h, which implies in particular that
(33) lim inf
h→0
P(λ) − P(1)
2h
≥ 0.
If we divide through by h in the individual components calculated above and then
send h to 0, it is easy to see that the only term that remains is Ams. Formally, (33)
and the calculations above must jointly imply that
(34)
1
λ
   
− 
  x+λδ
x−λδ
T(i,b  − b)db db ≥
   
− 
  x+δ
x−δ
T(i,b  − b)db db,
and this must be true for all λ ∈ (0,1) as well as all   ∈ (0,x− δ). Therefore we
may insist on the inequality in (34) holding as λ → 0. Performing the necessary
calculations, we may conclude that
(35)
1
 
   
− 
T(i,x − b)db ≥
1
 
   
− 
  x+δ
x−δ
T(i,b  − b)db db
for every   ∈ (0,x−δ). Finally, take   to zero in (35). This allows us to deduce that
(36) T(i,x) ≥
  x+δ
x−δ
T(i,b )db .
As (36) must hold for every x>0 and every δ ∈ (0,x), we may invoke Lemma 1
to conclude that T is concave in x for every i>0.
Lemma 3. Let g be a concave, continuous function on I R+, with g( 0 )=0 . Suppose that
for each a and a  with a>a   > 0, there exists ¯ ∆ > 0 such that
(37) g(a +∆ )− g(a) ≥ g(a ) − g(a  − ∆)
for all ∆ ∈ (0, ¯ ∆). Then g must be linear.
Proof. Given the concavity of g, it is easy to see that
g(a +∆ )− g(a) ≤ g(a ) − g(a  − ∆)
for all a>a   ≥ ∆ > 0. Combining this information with (37), we may conclude
that for each a and a  with a>a   > 0, there exists ¯ ∆ > 0 such that
g(a +∆ )− g(a)=g(a ) − g(a  − ∆)
for all ∆ ∈ (0, ¯ ∆). This, coupled with the premises that g is concave and g( 0 )=0 ,
shows that g is linear.
Lemma 4. There is a continuous function φ(i) such that T(i,a)=φ(i)a for all i and a.23
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Figure 5:
Proof. Fix numbers a and a  with a>a   > 0, and i>0. Consider the following
specialization of Axiom 3: take four basic densities as in that Axiom (see also
Figure 3) but specialize as shown in Figure 5; each is a transform of a uniform
basic density. The bases are centered at locations −y, −x, x and y, where x ≡
(a − a )/2 and y ≡ (a + a )/2. The “inner" densities are of width 2δ and height
h, and the “outer" densities are of width 2  and height i. In the sequel, we shall
vary δ,   and h but to make sure that the basic densities have disjoint support,
we restrict ourselves to values of δ and   such that  <xand δ +  <y− x − ¯ ∆
for some ¯ ∆ > 0. For convenience, the rectangles have been numbered 1, 2, 3
and 4 for use below. The exercise that we perform is to increase x by the small
amount ∆, where 0 < ∆ < ¯ ∆, as deﬁned above. Given this conﬁguration, we may
decompose the polarization measure (1) into several distinct components. First,
there is the “internal polarization" of each rectangle j; call it Pj, j =1 ,2,3,4. These
components are unchanged as we change x so there will be no need to calculate
them explicitly. Next, there is the total effective antagonism felt by inhabitants of
each rectangle towards another; call this Ajk(x), where j is the “origin" rectangle
and k is the “destination" rectangle. [We emphasize the dependence on x, which is
the parameter to be varied.] Thus total polarization P(x), again written explicitly24
as a function of x, is given by
P(x)=
4  
j=1
Pj +
 
j
 
k =j
Ajk(x)
=
4  
j=1
Pj +2 A12(x)+2 A13(x)+2 A21(x)+2 A31(x)+2 A23(x)+2 A14,
where the second equality simply exploits obvious symmetries and A14 is noted to
be independent of x. Let’s compute the terms in this formula that do change with
x. We have
A12(x)=
  −y+ 
−y− 
  −x+δ
−x−δ
T(i,b  − b)ihdb db,
A13(x)=
  −y+ 
−y− 
  x+δ
x−δ
T(i,b  − b)ihdb db,
A21(x)=
  −x+δ
−x−δ
  −y+ 
−y− 
T(h,b − b )ihdb db,
A31(x)=
  x+δ
x−δ
  −y+ 
−y− 
T(h,b − b )ihdb db,
and
A23(x)=
  −x+δ
−x−δ
  x+δ
x−δ
T(h,b − b )h2db db.
Now, the axiom requires that P(x +∆ )− P(x) ≥ 0. Equivalently, we require that
[P(x +∆ )− P(1)]/2ih ≥ 0 for all h, which implies in particular that
lim inf
h→0
P(x +∆ )− P(x)
2ih
≥ 0.
Using this information along with the computations for P(x) and the various
Ajk(x)’s, we see that
  −y+ 
−y− 
  x+δ
x−δ
[T(i,b  − b +∆ )− T(i,b  − b)]db db
≥
  −y+ 
−y− 
  −x+δ
−x−δ
[T(i,b  − b) − T(i,b  − b − ∆)]db db,
where in arriving at this inequality, we have carried out some elementary sub-
stitution of variables and transposition of terms. Dividing through by δ in this
expression and then taking δ to zero, we may conclude that
  −y+ 
−y− 
[T(i,x − b +∆ )− T(i,x − b)]db ≥
  −y+ 
−y− 
[T(i,−x − b) − T(i,−x − b − ∆)]db,
and dividing this inequality, in turn, by   and taking   to zero, we see that
T(i,a +∆ )− T(i,a) ≥ T(i,a ) − T(i,a  − ∆),
where we use the observations that x + y = a and y − x = a . Therefore the
conditions of Lemma 3 are satisﬁed, and T(i,.) must be linear for every i>0
since T(0,a): =0 . But this only means that there is a function φ(i) such that
T(i,a)=φ(i)a for every i and a. Given that T is continuous by assumption, the
same must be true25
of φ.
Lemma 5. φ(i) must be of the form Kiα, for constants (K,α)   0.
Proof. As a preliminary step, observe that
(38) φ(i) > 0 whenever i>0.
[For, ifthiswerefalseforsomei,Axiom3wouldfailforconﬁgurationsconstructed
from rectangular basic densities of equal height i.] Our ﬁrst objective is to prove
that φ must satisfy the fundamental Cauchy equation
(39) φ(p)φ(p )=φ(pp )φ(1)
for every strictly positive p and p . To this end, ﬁx p and p  and deﬁne r ≡ pp .
In what follows, we assume that p ≥ r. [If r ≥ p, simply permute p and r in
the argument below.] Consider the following conﬁguration. There are two basic
densities, both of width 2 , the ﬁrst centered at 0 and the second centered at 1.
The heights are p and h (where h is any strictly positive number, soon to be made
arbitrarily small). It is easy to see that the polarization of this conﬁguration, P,i s
given by
P = ph[φ(p)+φ(h)]{
   
− 
  1+ 
1− 
(b  − b)db db}
+[p2φ(p)+h2φ(h)]{
   
− 
   
− 
|b  − b|db db}
=4  2ph[φ(p)+φ(h)] +
8 3
3
[p2φ(p)+h2φ(h)], (40)
where the ﬁrst equality invokes Lemma 4 and both equalities use routine com-
putations. Now change the height of the ﬁrst rectangle to r . Using (38) and the
provisional assumption that p ≥ r, it is easy to see that for each  , there must exist
a (unique) height for the second rectangle — call it h( ), such that the polarizations
of the two conﬁgurations are equated. Invoking (40), we equivalently choose h( )
such that
ph[φ(p)+φ(h)] +
2 
3
[p2φ(p)+h2φ(h)]
= rh( )[φ(r)+φ(h( ))] +
2 
3
[r2φ(r)+h( )2φ(h( ))]. (41)
By Axiom 4, it follows that for all λ>0,
λ
2ph[φ(λp)+φ(λh)] +
2 
3
[(λp)2φ(λp)+( λh)2φ(λh)]
= λ
2rh( )[φ(λr)+φ(λh( ))] +
2 
3
[(λr)2φ(λr)+[ λh( )]2φ(λh( ))]. (42)
Notice that as   ↓ 0, h( ) lies in some bounded set. We may therefore extract a
convergent subsequence with limit h  as   ↓ 0. By the continuity of φ, we may pass
to the limit in (41) and (42) to conclude that
(43) ph[φ(p)+φ(h)] = rh [φ(r)+φ(h )]
and
(44) λ
2ph[φ(λp)+φ(λh)] = λ
2rh [φ(λr)+φ(λh )].26
Combining (43) and (44), we see that
(45)
φ(p)+φ(h)
φ(λp)+φ(λh)
=
φ(r)+φ(h )
φ(λr)+φ(λh )
.
Taking limits in (45) as h → 0 and noting that h  → 0 as a result (examine (43) to
conﬁrm this), we have for all λ>0,
(46)
φ(p)
φ(λp)
=
φ(r)
φ(λr)
.
Put λ =1 /p and recall that r = pp . Then (46) yields the required Cauchy equation
(39). To complete the proof, recall that φ is continuous and that (38) holds. The
class of solutions to (39) (that satisfy these additional qualiﬁcations) is completely
described by φ(p)=Kpα for constants (K,α)   0 (see, e.g., Acz´ el [1966, p. 41,
Theorem 3]).
Lemmas4and5togetherestablish“necessity",thoughitstillremainstoestablish
the bounds on α. We shall do so along with our proof of “sufﬁciency", which we
begin now. First notice that each basic density f with mass p, support [a,b] and
mean µ may be connected to its root — call it f∗ — by means of three numbers.
First, we slide the density so that it begins at 0; this amounts to a slide of a to the
left. The new mean is now m ≡ µ − a . Second, we income-scale the density so as
to change its mean from m = µ−a to 1. Finally, we population-scale to change the
overall mass of the density from p to unity.
Lemma6. Letf beabasicdensitywithmasspandmeanµonsupport[a,b]. Letm ≡ µ−a
and let f∗ denote the root of f. Then, if fλ denotes some λ-squeeze of f,
(47)
P(Fλ)=4 kp2+α(mλ)1−α
  1
0
f∗(x)1+α
   1
0
f∗(y)(1 − y)dy +
  1
x
f∗(y)(y − x)dy
 
dx
for some constant k>0.
Proof. Let f be given as in the statement of the lemma. Recall that a slide of the
entire distribution has no effect on the computations, so we may as well set a =0
and b =2 m, where m = µ − a is now to be interpreted as the mean. Given (3),
(48) P(F)=k
  
f(x)1+αf(y)|y − x|dydx
for some k>0. Using the fact that f is symmetric, we can write
P(F)=2 k
  m
0
  2m
0
f(x )1+αf(y )|x  − y |dy dx 
=2 k
  m
0
f(x )1+α
   x

0
f(y )(x  − y )dy  +
  m
x
f(y )(y  − x )dy 
+
  2m
m
f(y )(y  − x )dy }dx 
 
. (49)
Examine the very last term in (49). Change variables by setting z ≡ 2m − y , and
use symmetry to deduce that
  2m
m
f(y )(y  − x )dy  =
  m
0
f(z)(2m − x  − z)dz.27
Substituting this in (49), and manipulating terms, we obtain
(50)
P(F)=4 k
  m
0
f(x )1+α
   m
0
f(y )(m − y )dy  +
  m
x
f(y )(y  − x )dy 
 
dx .
Now suppose that fλ is a λ-squeeze of f. Note that ( 50) holds just as readily for
fλ as for f. Therefore, using the expression for f given in (2), we see that
P(Fλ)=4 kλ
−(2+α)
  m
(1−λ)m
f
 
x  − (1 − λ)m
λ
 1+α    m
(1−λ)m
f
 
y  − (1 − λ)m
λ
 
(m − y )dy 
+
  m
x
f
 
y  − (1 − λ)m
λ
 
(y  − x )dy }dx 
 
.
Perform the change of variables x   =
x
−(1−λ)m
λ and y   =
y
−(1−λ)m
λ . Then it is
easy to see that
P(Fλ)=4 kλ
1−α
  m
0
f(x  )1+α
   m
0
f(y  )(m − y  )dy   +
  m
x
f(y  )(y   − x  )dy  
 
dx  .
To complete the proof, we must recover the root f∗ from f. To this end, ﬁrst
population-scale f to h, where h has mass 1. That is, f(z)=ph(z) for all z. Doing
so, we see that
P(Fλ)=4 kp2+αλ
1−α
  m
0
h(x  )1+α
   m
0
h(y  )(m − y  )dy   +
  m
x
h(y  )(y   − x  )dy  
 
dx  .
Finally, make the change of variables x = x  /m and y = y  /m. Noting that
f∗(z)=mh(mz), we get (47).
Lemma 7. Let f and g be two basic densities with disjoint support, with their means
separated by distance d, and with population masses p and q respectively. Let f have mean
µ on support [a,b]. Let m ≡ µ−a and let f∗ denote the root of f. Then for any λ -squeeze
fλ of f,
(51) A(fλ,g)=2 kdp1+αq(mλ)−α
  1
0
f∗(x)1+αdx,
where A(fλ,g) denotes the total effective antagonism felt by members of fλ towards mem-
bers of g.
Proof. Tobeginwith,ignoretheλ-squeeze. Noticethatthereisnolossofgenerality
in assuming that every income under g dominates every income under f. It also
makesnodifferencetopolarizationwhetherornotweslidetheentireconﬁguration
totheleftorright. Thereforewemaysupposethatf hassupport[0,2m](withmean
m ) and g has support [d,d +2 m] (where obviously we must have d ≥ 2m for the28
disjoint support assumption to make sense). Because (48) is true, it must be that
A(f,g)=k
  2m
0
f(x)1+α
   d+2m
d
g(y)(y − x)dy
 
dx
= k
  2m
0
f(x)1+α
   d+m
d
g(y)(y − x)dy +
  d+2m
d+m
g(y)(y − x)dy
 
dx
= k
  2m
0
f(x)1+α
   d+m
d
g(y)2(m + d − x)dy
 
dx
= kq
  2m
0
f(x)1+α(m + d − x)dx
=2 dkq
  m
0
f(x)1+αdx,
where the third equality exploits the symmetry of g,
19 the fourth equality uses the
fact that
  d+m
d g(y)=q/2, and the ﬁnal equality uses the symmetry of f.
20 To be
sure, this formula applies to any λ -squeeze of f, so that
A(fλ,g)=2 dkq
  m
0
fλ(x )1+αdx 
=2 dkqλ
−(1+α)
  m
(1−λ)m
f
 
x  − (1 − λ)m
λ
 1+α
dx ,
and making the change of variables x   =
x
−(1−λ)m
λ , we may conclude that
A(fλ,g)=2 dkqλ
−α
  m
0
f(x  )1+αdx  .
To complete the proof, we must recover the root f∗ from f. As in the proof of
Lemma 6, ﬁrst population-scale f to h, where h has mass 1. That is, f(z)=ph(z)
for all z. Doing so, we see that
A(fλ,g)=2 dkp1+αqλ
−α
  m
0
h(x  )1+αdx  .
Finally, make the change of variables x = x  /m. Noting that f∗(z)=mh(mz),w e
get (51).
Lemma 8. Deﬁne, for any root f and α>0,
(52) ψ(f,α) ≡
  1
0 f(x)1+αdx
  1
0 f(x)1+α
   1
0 f(y)(1 − y)dy +
  1
x f(y)(y − x)dy
 
dx
.
Then — for any α>0 — ψ(f,α) attains its minimum value when f is the uniform root,
and this minimum value equals 3.
19That is, for each y ∈ [d,d + m], g(y)=g(d +2 m − (y − d)) = g(2d +2 m − y). Moreover,
[y − x] + [(2d +2 m − y) − x]=2 ( d + m − x).
20That is, for each x ∈ [0,m], f(x)=f(2m−x). Moreover, [m+d−x]+[m+d−(2m−x) ]=2 d.29
Proof. It will be useful to work with the inverse function
ζ(f,α) ≡ ψ(f,α)−1 =
  1
0 f(x)1+α
   1
0 f(y)(1 − y)dy +
  1
x f(y)(y − x)dy
 
dx
  1
0 f(x)1+αdx
.
Note that ζ(f,α) may be viewed as a weighted average of
(53) L(x) ≡
  1
0
f(y)(1 − y)dy +
  1
x
f(y)(y − x)dy
as this expression varies over x ∈ [0,1], where the “weight" on a particular x is just
f(x)1+α
  1
0 f(z)1+αdz
which integrates over x to 1. Now observe that L(x) is decreasing in x. Moreover,
by the unimodality of a root, the weights must be nondecreasing in x. It follows
that
(54) ζ(f,α) ≤
  1
0
L(x)dx.
Now
L(x)=
  1
0
f(y)(1 − y)dy +
  1
x
f(y)(y − x)dy
=
  1
0
f(y)(1 − x)dy +
  x
0
f(y)(x − y)dy
=
1 − x
2
+
  x
0
f(y)(x − y)dy. (55)
Because f(x) is nondecreasing and integrates to 1/2 on [0,1], it must be the case
that
  x
0 f(y)(x−y)dy ≤
  x
0 (x−y)/2dy for all x ≤ 1. Using this information in (55)
and combining it with ( 54),
ζ(f,α) ≤
  1
0
 
1 − x
2
+
  x
0
x − y
2
dy
 
dx
=
  1
0
   1
0
 
1 − y
2
 
dy +
  1
x
 
y − x
2
 
dy
 
dx
= ζ(u,α), (56)
where u stands for the uniform root taking constant value 1/2 on [0,2]. Simple
integration reveals that ζ(u,α)=1 /3.
Lemma 9. Given that P(f) is of the form (48), Axiom 1 is satisﬁed if and only if α ≤ 1.
Proof. Simply inspect (47).
Lemma10. GiventhatP(f)isoftheform(48),Axiom2issatisﬁedifandonlyifα ≥ 0.25.
Proof. Consider a conﬁguration as given in Axiom 2: a symmetric distribution
made out of three basic densities. By symmetry, the side densities must share
the same root; call this f∗. Let p denote their (common) population mass and
m their (common) difference from their means to their lower support. Likewise,
denote the root of the middle density by g∗,b yq its population mass, and by n the
difference between mean and lower support. As in the proof of Lemma 2, we may30
decompose the polarization measure (48) into several components. First, there are
the“internalpolarizations"ofthemiddledensity(Pm)andofthetwosidedensities
(Ps). Next, there are various subtotals of effective antagonism felt by members of
one of the basic densities towards another basic density. Let Ams denote this when
the “origin" density is the middle and the “destination" density one of the sides.
Likewise, Asm is obtained by permuting origin and destination densities. Finally,
denote by Ass the total effective antagonism felt by inhabitants of one side towards
the other side. Observe that each of these last four terms appear twice, so that
(writing everything as a function of λ), overall polarization is given by
(57) P(λ)=Pm +2 Ps(λ)+2 Ams(λ)+2 Asm(λ)+2 Ass(λ).
Compute these terms. For brevity, deﬁne for any root h,
ψ1(h,α) ≡
  1
0
h(x)1+α
   1
0
h(y)(1 − y)dy +
  1
x
h(y)(y − x)dy
 
dx
and
ψ2(h,α) ≡
  1
0
h(x)1+αdx.
Now, using Lemmas 6 and 7, we see that
Ps(λ)=4 kp2+α(mλ)1−αψ1(f∗,α),
while
Ams(λ)=2 kdq1+αpn−αψ2(g∗,α).
Moreover,
Asm(λ)=2 kdp1+αq(mλ)−αψ2(f∗,α),
and
Ass(λ)=4 kdp2+α(mλ)−αψ2(f∗,α),
(whereitshouldberememberedthatthedistancebetweenthemeansofthetwoside
densities is 2d). Observe from these calculations that Ams(λ) is entirely insensitive
to λ. Consequently, feeding all the computed terms into (57), we may conclude
that
P(λ)=C
 
2λ
1−α +
d
m
ψ(f∗,α)λ
−α{
q
p
+2 }
 
+ D,
where C and D are positive constants independent of λ, and
ψ(f∗,α)=
ψ2(f∗,α)
ψ1(f∗,α)
by construction; see (52) in the statement of Lemma 8. It follows from this expres-
sion that for Axiom 2 to hold, it is necessary and sufﬁcient that for every three-
density conﬁguration of the sort described in that axiom,
(58) 2λ
1−α +
d
m
ψ(f∗,α)λ
−α
 
q
p
+2
 
must be nonincreasing in λ over (0,1]. An examination of the expression in (58)
quickly shows that a situation in which q is arbitrarily close to zero (relative to p)
is a necessary and sufﬁcient test case. By the same logic, one should make d/m
as small as possible. The disjoint-support hypothesis of Axiom 2 tells us that this31
lowest value is 1. So it will be necessary and sufﬁcient to show that for every root
f∗,
(59) λ
1−α + ψ(f∗,α)λ
−α
is nonincreasing in λ over (0,1]. For any f∗, it is easy enough to compute the
necessary and sufﬁcient bounds on α. Simple differentiation reveals that
(1 − α)λ
−α − αψ(f∗,α)λ
−(1+α)
must be nonnegative for every λ ∈ (0,1]; the necessary and sufﬁcient condition for
this is
(60) α ≥
1
1+ψ(f∗,α)
.
Therefore, to ﬁnd the necessary and sufﬁcient bound on α (uniform over all roots),
we need to minimize ψ(f∗,α) by choice of f∗, subject to the condition that f∗ be
a root. By Lemma 8 , this minimum value is 3. Using this information in (60), we
are done.
Lemma 11. Given that P(f) is of the form (48), Axiom 3 is satisﬁed.
Proof. Consider a symmetric distribution composed of four basic densities, as in
the statement of Axiom 3. Number the densities 1, 2, 3 and 4, in the same order
displayed in Figure 5. Let x denote the amount of the slide (experienced by the
inner densities) in the axiom. For each such x, let djk(x) denote the (absolute)
difference between the means of basic densities j and k. As we have done several
timesbefore, wemaydecomposethepolarizationofthisconﬁgurationintoseveral
components. First, there is the “internal polarization" of each rectangle j; call it
Pj, j =1 ,2,3,4. [These will stay unchanged with x.] Next, there is the total
effective antagonism felt by inhabitants of each basic density towards another; call
this Ajk(x), where j is the “origin" density and k is the “destination" density. Thus
total polarization P(x), again written explicitly as a function of x, is given by
P(x)=
4  
j=1
Pj +
 
j
 
k =j
Ajk(x)
so that, using symmetry,
(61) P(x) − P( 0 )=2 {[A12(x)+A13(x)] − [A12(0) + A13(0)]} +[ A23(x) − A23(0)]
Now Lemma 7 tells us that for all i and j,
Aij(x)=kijdij(x),
where kij is a positive constant which is independent of distances across the two
basic densities, and in particular is independent of x. Using this information in
(61), it is trivial to see that
P(x) − P(0) = A23(x) − A23(0) = kijx>0,
so that Axiom 3 is satisﬁed.
Given (48), Axiom 4 is trivial to verify. Therefore Lemmas 9, 10 and 11 complete
the proof of the theorem.32
Proof of Observation 1. First note that |x − y| = x+y−2min(x,y). Hence, by (3),
Pα(f)=
 
x
 
y
f(y)α (x + y − 2min(x,y)) dF(y)dF(x).
To prove (8), note that
(62)
 
x
 
y
xf(y)α dF(y)dF(x)=µ
 
y
f(y)α dF(y)
and that
 
x
 
y
f(y)α min(x,y)dF(y)dF(x)
=
 
x
  y=x
y=−∞
yf(y)αdF(y)dF(x)+
 
x
  ∞
y=x
xf(y)αdF(y)dF(x). (63)
The ﬁrst term in (63) can be integrated by parts over x:
  y=x
y=−∞
yf(y)αdF(y)F(x)
 
 
 
 
∞
−∞
−
 
xf(x)αF(x)dF(x)
=
 
yf(y)αdF(y) −
 
xf(x)αF(x)dF(x)
=
 
yf(y)α (1 − F(y))dF(y). (64)
The last term in (63) can also be integrated by parts over x as follows:
 
x
  ∞
y=x
xf(y)αdF(y)dF(x)=
 
x
  ∞
y=x
f(y)αdF(y)xdF(x)
= µ∗(x)
  ∞
y=x
f(y)αdF(y)
 
 
 
 
x=∞
x=−∞
+
 
x
µ∗(x)f(x)αdF(x)
=
 
y
µ∗(y)f(y)αdF(y), (65)
where µ∗(x)=
  x
−∞ zdF(z) is a partial mean. Adding terms yields (8), and com-
pletes the proof.
ProofofObservation2. Itwillbeenoughtoshowthat2ay(yi)=a˜ y(˜ y2i−1)+a˜ y(˜ y2i)
since we have assumed that fy(yi)=f˜ y(˜ y2i−1)=f˜ y(˜ y2i) for all i =1 ,...,n.
Clearly, µy = µ˜ y. Note also that a˜ y(˜ y2i−1) can be expressed as
(66)
a˜ y(˜ y2i−1)=µy + yi
 
(2n)
−1 (2(2i − 1) − 1) − 1
 
− (2n)
−1

2
2i−2  
j=1
˜ yj +˜ y2i−1

.
Similarly, for a˜ y(˜ y2i), we have
(67) a˜ y(˜ y2i)=µy + yi
 
(2n)
−1 (2(2i) − 1) − 1
 
− (2n)
−1

2
2i−1  
j=1
˜ yj +˜ y2i

.33
Summing (66) and (67), we ﬁnd
a˜ y(˜ y2i−1)+a˜ y(˜ y2i)=2

µy + yi
 
n−1(2i − 1) − 1
 
− n−1

2
i−1  
j=1
yj + yi




=2 ay(yi). (68)
Adding up the product of fy(˜ yj)a˜ y(˜ yj) across j and dividing by 2n shows that
Pα( Fy)=Pα(F˜ y).
Proof of Theorem 2. Consider ﬁrst (16). Note that
   
  f(y)α − f(y)α
 
a(y)dF(y) ∼ =
 
αf(y)α−1
 
  f(y) − f(y)
 
a(y)dF(y)
= α
 
pα−1(y)n−1
n  
i=1
Kh (y − yi)dF(y) − α
 
pα(y)dF(y)
= αn−1
n  
i=1
 
pα−1(y)Kh (y − yi)dF(y) − α
 
pα(y)dF(y). (69)
Taking h → 0 as n →∞ , and recalling that
 
Kh (y − yi)dy =1 , the ﬁrst term in
(69) tends asymptotically to
αn−1
n  
i=1
 
pα−1(y)Kh (y − yi)dF(y) ∼ = αn−1
n  
i=1
pα−1(yi)f(yi)=αn−1
n  
i=1
pα(yi).
Thus, we can rewrite the term on the right-hand side of (16) as
   
  f(y)α − f(y)α
 
a(y)dF(y) ∼ = αn−1
n  
i=1
(pα(yi) − Pα)=O(n−1/2).
Now turn to (17). Let I be an indicator function that equals 1 if its argument is true
and 0 otherwise. We ﬁnd:
 
f(y)α (  a(y) − a(y))dF(y)
=
 
f(y)α
  
  µ + y
 
2  F(y) − 1
 
− 2  µ
∗(y)
 
− a(y)
 
dF(y)
∼ =
 
f(y)α
 
n−1  n
i=1
{yi + y (2I[yi ≤ y] − 1) − 2yiI[yi ≤ y]}−a(y)
 
dF(y)
= n−1  n
i=1
 
f(y)α (yi [1 − 2I[yi ≤ y] ]+2 yI[yi ≤ y])dF(y)
−
 
f(y)α (µ +2 yF(y) − 2µ∗(y))dF(y)
= n−1  n
i=1
  
f(y)αdF(y)yi − 2yi
  ∞
yi
f(y)αdF(y)+2
  ∞
yi
yf(y)αdF(y)
 
−
 
f(y)α (µ +2 yF(y) − 2µ∗(y))dF(y)
= O(n−1/2).34
Now consider (18):
 
pα(y)d
 
  F − F
 
(y)=n−1  n
i=1
(f(yi)αa(yi) − Pα)=O(n−1/2).
Collecting and summarizing terms, we obtain:
Pα(  F) − Pα(f) ∼ = n−1  n
i=1
 
(1 + α)f(yi)αa(yi)+
 
yif(y)αdF(y)+2
  ∞
yi
(y − yi)f(y)αdF(y)
 
−
 
(1 + α)Pα(f)+
 
f(y)α (µ +2 ( yF(y) − µ∗(y)))dF(y)
 
.
ApplyingthelawoflargenumberstoPα(  F)−Pα(f),notethatlimn→∞ I E
 
n0.5
 
Pα(  F) − Pα(f)
  
=
0.Thecentrallimittheoremthenleadstotheﬁndingthatn0.5
 
Pα(  F) − Pα(f)
 
has
a limiting normal distribution N(0,V α), with Vα as described in the statement of
the theorem.
ProofofTheorem3. Using(16)–(18),wemaywritebiash(  Fα)=I E
 
Pα(  F) − Pα(f)
 
as:
I E
 
Pα(  F) − Pα(f)
 
∼ =
 
I E
 
  f(y)α − f(y)α
 
a(y)dF(y)
+
 
f(y)αI E[  a(y) − a(y)]dF(y)+
 
pα(y)dI E
 
  F − F
 
(y)
=
 
I E
 
  f(y)α − f(y)α
 
a(y)dF(y), (70)
since   a(y) and   F(y) are unbiased estimators of (y) and F(y) respectively. For
I E
 
  f(y)α − f(y)α
 
, we may use a ﬁrst-order Taylor expansion around f(y)α :
I E
 
  f(y)α − f(y)α
 
∼ = αf(y)α−1I E
 
  f(y) − f(y)
 
.
For symmetric kernel functions, the bias I E
 
  f(y) − f(y)
 
can be shown to be ap-
proximately equal to (see for instance Silverman (1986, p.39))
(71) 0.5h2σ2
Kf  (y),
where f  (y) is the second-order derivative of the density function. Hence, the bias
I E
 
Pα(  F) − Pα(f)
 
is approximately equal to
(72) I E
 
Pα(  F) − Pα(f)
 
∼ = 0.5ασ2
Kh2
 
f  (y)pα(y)dy = O(h2).
It follows that the bias will be low if the kernel function has a low variance σ2
K:
it is precisely then that the observations “closer” to y will count more, and those
are also the observations that provide the least biased estimate of the density at y.
But the bias also depends on the curvature of f(y), as weighted by pα(y): in the
absence of such a curvature, the density function is linear and the bias provided by
using observations on the left of y is just (locally) outweighed by the bias provided
by using observations on the right of y. For the variance varh
 
Pα(  f)
 
, we ﬁrst35
reconsider the ﬁrst term in (69), which is the dominant term through which the
choice of h inﬂuences var
 
Pα(  f)
 
. We may write this as follows:
αn−1
n  
i=1
 
pα(y)Kh (y − yi)dy = αn−1
n  
i=1
 
pα(yi − ht)K (t)dt
∼ = αn−1
n  
i=1
 
K (t)
 
pα(yi) − htp 
α(yi)+0 .5h2t2p  
α(yi)
 
dt
= αn−1
n  
i=1
 
pα(yi)+0 .5σ2
Kh2p  
α(yi)
 
, (73)
where the ﬁrst equality substitutes t for h−1(yi−y), where the succeeding approxi-
mationistheresultofTaylor-expandingpα(yi−ht)aroundt =0 ,andwherethelast
line follows from the properties of the kernel function K(t). Thus, combining (73)
and (21) to incorporate a ﬁnite-sample correction for the role of h in the variance
of   fα, we can write:
varh
 
Pα(  f)
 
= n−1 var
f(y)
 
0.5ασ2
Kh2p  
α(y)+vα(y)
 
= O(n−1).
For small h, the impact of h on the ﬁnite sample variance comes predominantly
from the covariance between vα(y) and p  
α(y) since var
 
0.5ασ2
Kh2p  
α(y)
 
is then
of smaller order h4. This covariance, however, is not easily unravelled. When
the covariance is negative (which we do expect to observe), a larger value of h
will tend to decrease varh
 
Pα(  f)
 
since this will tend to level the distribution of
0.5ασ2
Kh2p  
α(y)+vα(y), which is the random variable whose variance determines
the sampling variance of Pα(  f). Combining squared-bias and variance into (23),
we obtain:
MSEh(Pα(  f)) =
 
0.5ασ2
Kh2
 
f  (y)pα(y)dy
 2
+ n−1 var
f(y)
 
0.5ασ2
Kh2p  
α(y)+vα(y)
 
.
h∗(n) is found by minimizing MSEh(Pα(  f)) with respect to h. The derivative of
MSEh(Pα(  f)) with respect to h gives:
h3
 
ασ2
K
 
f  (y)pα(y)dy
 2
+ n−1ασ2
Kh
    
0.5ασ2
Kh2p  
α(y)+vα(y)
 
−
 
0.5ασ2
Kh2
 
p  
α(y)dF(y)+
 
vα(y)dF(y)
   
p  
α(y) −
 
p  
α(y)dF(y)
 
dF(y).
Since h∗(n) > 0 in ﬁnite samples, we may divide the above expression by h, and
then ﬁnd h∗(n) by setting the result equal to 0. This yields:
(74) h∗(n)
2 = −
n−1cov(vα(y),p   
α(y))
ασ2
K
   
f  (y)pα(y)dy
 2
− 0.5n−1var(p  (y)pα(y))
 
For large n (and thus for a small optimal h), h∗(n) is thus given by
(75) h∗(n)=
 
−
cov(vα(y),p   
α(y))
ασ2
K
  
f  (y)pα(y)dy
 2n−0.5 + O
 
n−1 
This completes the proof.36
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Table 1: LIS country codes
Abbreviations Countries Years Sample Sizes
as Australia 1989 / 1994 16,331 / 7,441
be Belgium 1992 / 1997 3,821 / 4,632
cn Canada 1991 / 1994 21,647 / 40,849
cz Czech Republic 1992 / 1996 16,234 / 28,148
dk Denmark 1992 / 1995 12,895 / 13,124
ﬁ Finland 1991 / 1995 11,749 / 9,263
fr France 1989 / 1994 9,038 / 11,294
ge Germany 1989 / 1994 4,187 / 6,045
hu Hungary 1991 / 1994 2,019 / 1,992
is Israel 1992 / 1997 5,212 / 5,230
it Italy 1991 / 1994 8,188 / 8,135
lx Luxembourg 1991 / 1994 1,957 / 1,813
mx Mexico 1989 / 1996 11,531 / 14,042
nl Netherlands 1991 / 1994 4,378 / 5,187
nw Norway 1991 / 1995 8,073 / 10,127
pl Poland 1992 / 1995 6,602 / 32,009
rc Rep. of China / Taiwan 1991 / 1995 16,434 / 14,706
ru Russia 1992 / 1995 6,361 / 3,518
sw Sweden 1992 / 1995 12,484 / 16,260
uk United Kingdom 1991 / 1995 7,056 / 6,797
us United States 1991 / 1994 16,052 / 66,01439
Table 2: Polarization indices and polarization rankings (Rkg) from LIS’ Wave 3 –
Standard errors appear on the second line
Index Rkg Index Rkg Index Rkg Index Rkg Index Rkg
α= 0 0.25 0.50 0.75 1
Countries
cz92 0.2082 1 0.1767 1 0.1637 2 0.1585 4 0.1575 11
0.0023 0.0014 0.0011 0.0011 0.0012
ﬁ91 0.2086 2 0.1782 2 0.1611 1 0.1505 1 0.1436 1
0.0017 0.0010 0.0007 0.0005 0.0005
be92 0.2236 3 0.1898 4 0.1699 4 0.1571 3 0.1484 3
0.0028 0.0018 0.0012 0.0010 0.0010
sw92 0.2267 4 0.1888 3 0.1674 3 0.1543 2 0.1459 2
0.0019 0.0012 0.0008 0.0006 0.0006
nw91 0.2315 5 0.1919 5 0.1713 5 0.1588 5 0.1505 5
0.0029 0.0017 0.0013 0.0011 0.0011
dk92 0.2367 6 0.1964 6 0.1744 6 0.1603 6 0.1504 4
0.0026 0.0015 0.0011 0.0010 0.0011
lx91 0.2389 7 0.2002 7 0.1787 8 0.1652 8 0.1563 10
0.0051 0.0032 0.0024 0.0022 0.0023
ge89 0.2469 8 0.2019 8 0.1779 7 0.1634 7 0.1540 7
0.0048 0.0028 0.0021 0.0020 0.0021
nl91 0.2633 9 0.2122 9 0.1859 9 0.1700 9 0.1596 16
0.0054 0.0031 0.0024 0.0024 0.0025
rc91 0.2708 10 0.2189 10 0.1902 11 0.1723 14 0.1603 17
0.0019 0.0011 0.0009 0.0008 0.0009
pl92 0.2737 11 0.2193 11 0.1894 10 0.1706 11 0.1577 13
0.0032 0.0019 0.0014 0.0012 0.0013
fr89 0.2815 12 0.2229 12 0.1912 12 0.1715 12 0.1580 14
0.0033 0.0019 0.0014 0.0013 0.0014
hu91 0.2828 13 0.2230 13 0.1913 13 0.1719 13 0.1587 15
0.0066 0.0039 0.0028 0.0026 0.0027
it91 0.2887 14 0.2307 15 0.1968 15 0.1741 15 0.1577 12
0.0028 0.0016 0.0012 0.0011 0.0012
cn91 0.2891 15 0.2301 14 0.1945 14 0.1701 10 0.1523 6
0.0018 0.0011 0.0008 0.0006 0.0006
is92 0.3055 16 0.2421 17 0.2051 17 0.1804 18 0.1626 18
0.0036 0.0021 0.0016 0.0015 0.0015
as89 0.3084 17 0.2421 16 0.2023 16 0.1750 16 0.1549 8
0.0020 0.0012 0.0008 0.0007 0.0008
uk91 0.3381 18 0.2607 18 0.2185 19 0.1911 19 0.1716 19
0.0053 0.0028 0.0023 0.0023 0.0025
us91 0.3394 19 0.2625 19 0.2140 18 0.1802 17 0.1551 9
0.0019 0.0012 0.0008 0.0006 0.0006
ru92 0.4017 20 0.2957 20 0.2400 20 0.2046 20 0.1797 20
0.0066 0.0035 0.0029 0.0029 0.0031
mx89 0.4909 21 0.3462 21 0.2802 21 0.2432 21 0.2202 21
0.0055 0.0034 0.0030 0.0032 0.003640
Table 3: Polarization indices and polarization rankings (Rkg) from LIS’ Wave 4 –
Standard errors appear on the second line
Index Rkg Index Rkg Index Rkg Index Rkg Index Rkg
α= 0 0.25 0.50 0.75 1
Countries
ﬁ95 0.2174 1 0.1832 1 0.1661 2 0.1564 2 0.1506 6
0.0027 0.0016 0.0012 0.0011 0.0012
sw95 0.2218 2 0.1845 2 0.1652 1 0.1549 1 0.1498 3
0.0019 0.0012 0.0008 0.0007 0.0008
lx94 0.2353 3 0.1978 4 0.1764 4 0.1633 7 0.1549 8
0.0043 0.0028 0.0021 0.0017 0.0019
nw95 0.2403 4 0.1970 3 0.1750 3 0.1616 3 0.1527 7
0.0049 0.0029 0.0024 0.0023 0.0024
be97 0.2496 5 0.2061 5 0.1796 5 0.1616 4 0.1486 1
0.0029 0.0018 0.0012 0.0010 0.0010
dk95 0.2532 6 0.2073 6 0.1808 6 0.1632 6 0.1504 5
0.0026 0.0015 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011
nl94 0.2558 7 0.2094 7 0.1812 7 0.1624 5 0.1491 2
0.0029 0.0018 0.0012 0.0009 0.0010
cz96 0.2589 8 0.2104 8 0.1854 9 0.1709 10 0.1618 13
0.0017 0.0010 0.0008 0.0007 0.0008
ge94 0.2649 9 0.2133 9 0.1846 8 0.1669 8 0.1553 10
0.0048 0.0030 0.0023 0.0021 0.0022
rc95 0.2781 10 0.2234 10 0.1931 10 0.1742 11 0.1614 12
0.0021 0.0013 0.0009 0.0009 0.0010
cn94 0.2859 11 0.2289 12 0.1933 11 0.1687 9 0.1504 4
0.0011 0.0007 0.0005 0.0004 0.0003
fr94 0.2897 12 0.2284 11 0.1963 12 0.1766 13 0.1634 14
0.0031 0.0018 0.0014 0.0013 0.0014
as94 0.3078 13 0.2433 14 0.2033 14 0.1757 12 0.1553 9
0.0028 0.0016 0.0012 0.0010 0.0011
pl95 0.3108 14 0.2389 13 0.2023 13 0.1799 14 0.1645 15
0.0024 0.0014 0.0011 0.0010 0.0011
hu94 0.3248 15 0.2486 15 0.2087 15 0.1852 15 0.1700 18
0.0081 0.0048 0.0037 0.0035 0.0038
is97 0.3371 16 0.2598 17 0.2159 17 0.1871 18 0.1666 17
0.0044 0.0025 0.0019 0.0018 0.0020
it95 0.3406 17 0.2596 16 0.2148 16 0.1856 16 0.1647 16
0.0037 0.0021 0.0016 0.0015 0.0016
uk95 0.3429 18 0.2622 18 0.2193 18 0.1925 19 0.1741 19
0.0041 0.0022 0.0018 0.0018 0.0020
us94 0.3622 19 0.2747 19 0.2223 19 0.1868 17 0.1610 11
0.0010 0.0006 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004
ru95 0.4497 20 0.3222 20 0.2566 20 0.2164 20 0.1889 20
0.0061 0.0035 0.0028 0.0028 0.0030
mx96 0.4953 21 0.3483 21 0.2826 21 0.2464 21 0.2237 21
0.0046 0.0028 0.0025 0.0027 0.003041
Table4: CorrelationofpolarizationindicesandpolarizationrankingsforLISWaves
3 and 4
Wave 3
Matrix of Pearson Correlation for Polarization Indices
alpha 0 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
0 1.0000 0.9986 0.9979 0.9788 0.8943
0.25 0.9986 1.0000 0.9974 0.9723 0.8780
0.50 0.9979 0.9974 1.0000 0.9862 0.9087
0.75 0.9788 0.9723 0.9862 1.0000 0.9651
1.00 0.8943 0.8780 0.9087 0.9651 1.0000
Wave 3
Matrix of Spearman Rank Correlation for Polarization Indices
alpha 0 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
0 1.0000 0.9961 0.9909 0.9558 0.6753
0.25 0.9961 1.0000 0.9948 0.9662 0.6974
0.50 0.9909 0.9948 1.0000 0.9779 0.7325
0.75 0.9558 0.9662 0.9779 1.0000 0.8182
1.00 0.6753 0.6974 0.7325 0.8182 1.0000
Wave 4
Matrix of Pearson Correlation for Polarization Indices
alpha 0 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
0 1.0000 0.9987 0.9977 0.9786 0.9041
0.25 0.9987 1.0000 0.9973 0.9729 0.8902
0.50 0.9977 0.9973 1.0000 0.9870 0.9200
0.75 0.9786 0.9729 0.9870 1.0000 0.9709
1.00 0.9041 0.8902 0.9200 0.9709 1.0000
Wave 4
Matrix of Spearman Rank Correlation for Polarization Indices
alpha 0 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
0 1.0000 0.9948 0.9935 0.9701 0.8195
0.25 0.9948 1.0000 0.9961 0.9701 0.8013
0.50 0.9935 0.9961 1.0000 0.9792 0.8221
0.75 0.9701 0.9701 0.9792 1.0000 0.9013
1.00 0.8195 0.8013 0.8221 0.9013 1.00004
2
Table 5: Alienation and identiﬁcation – LIS Wave 3
α = 0 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
Country Gini ¯ ιc
∗ ¯ ι · c
∗ P ¯ ιc
∗ ¯ ι · c
∗ P ¯ ιc
∗ ¯ ι · c
∗ P ¯ ιc
∗ ¯ ι · c
∗ P
as89 0.3084 0.8508 0.9227 0.7851 0.2421 0.7440 0.8815 0.6559 0.2023 0.6627 0.8562 0.5675 0.1750 0.5984 0.8394 0.5023 0.1549
be92 0.2233 0.9110 0.9327 0.8497 0.1897 0.8518 0.8931 0.7608 0.1699 0.8105 0.8678 0.7034 0.1571 0.7811 0.8506 0.6643 0.1484
cn91 0.2891 0.8634 0.9219 0.7960 0.2301 0.7658 0.8784 0.6727 0.1945 0.6916 0.8509 0.5885 0.1701 0.6332 0.8321 0.5269 0.1523
cz92 0.2081 0.9504 0.8935 0.8492 0.1767 0.9337 0.8423 0.7865 0.1637 0.9364 0.8132 0.7615 0.1585 0.9526 0.7944 0.7567 0.1575
dk92 0.2367 0.9051 0.9169 0.8298 0.1964 0.8415 0.8759 0.7370 0.1744 0.7952 0.8519 0.6774 0.1603 0.7598 0.8361 0.6352 0.1504
ﬁ91 0.2086 0.9227 0.9259 0.8543 0.1782 0.8747 0.8829 0.7723 0.1611 0.8440 0.8547 0.7214 0.1505 0.8248 0.8345 0.6882 0.1435
fr89 0.2815 0.8782 0.9015 0.7917 0.2229 0.7978 0.8514 0.6792 0.1912 0.7406 0.8224 0.6091 0.1715 0.6979 0.8041 0.5612 0.1580
ge89 0.2469 0.9021 0.9066 0.8179 0.2019 0.8398 0.8583 0.7208 0.1779 0.7984 0.8290 0.6618 0.1634 0.7707 0.8094 0.6238 0.1540
hu91 0.2828 0.8797 0.8965 0.7887 0.2230 0.8007 0.8451 0.6767 0.1913 0.7451 0.8157 0.6078 0.1719 0.7042 0.7972 0.5614 0.1587
is92 0.3055 0.8626 0.9188 0.7926 0.2421 0.7663 0.8761 0.6714 0.2051 0.6944 0.8505 0.5906 0.1804 0.6384 0.8337 0.5322 0.1626
it91 0.2887 0.8676 0.9212 0.7993 0.2307 0.7745 0.8802 0.6817 0.1968 0.7046 0.8558 0.6030 0.1741 0.6501 0.8404 0.5463 0.1577
lx91 0.2389 0.9088 0.9222 0.8381 0.2002 0.8490 0.8807 0.7477 0.1787 0.8081 0.8557 0.6915 0.1652 0.7798 0.8392 0.6544 0.1563
mx89 0.4909 0.8343 0.8453 0.7052 0.3462 0.7302 0.7817 0.5707 0.2802 0.6588 0.7520 0.4954 0.2432 0.6090 0.7366 0.4486 0.2202
nl91 0.2633 0.8952 0.9003 0.8059 0.2122 0.8280 0.8526 0.7059 0.1859 0.7822 0.8255 0.6457 0.1700 0.7499 0.8084 0.6062 0.1596
nw91 0.2315 0.9128 0.9082 0.8290 0.1919 0.8581 0.8623 0.7400 0.1713 0.8216 0.8347 0.6859 0.1588 0.7970 0.8158 0.6502 0.1505
pl92 0.2737 0.8837 0.9067 0.8013 0.2193 0.8068 0.8575 0.6919 0.1894 0.7526 0.8278 0.6230 0.1705 0.7129 0.8081 0.5762 0.1577
rc91 0.2708 0.8883 0.9099 0.8083 0.2189 0.8152 0.8616 0.7024 0.1902 0.7645 0.8323 0.6362 0.1723 0.7281 0.8130 0.5919 0.1603
ru92 0.4017 0.8300 0.8868 0.7361 0.2957 0.7138 0.8369 0.5974 0.2400 0.6282 0.8108 0.5094 0.2046 0.5622 0.7960 0.4475 0.1797
sw92 0.2267 0.9077 0.9177 0.8330 0.1888 0.8499 0.8691 0.7387 0.1674 0.8126 0.8376 0.6807 0.1543 0.7889 0.8159 0.6436 0.1459
uk91 0.3381 0.8521 0.9047 0.7709 0.2607 0.7498 0.8618 0.6461 0.2185 0.6737 0.8390 0.5652 0.1911 0.6145 0.8258 0.5074 0.1716
us91 0.3394 0.8298 0.9320 0.7734 0.2625 0.7063 0.8930 0.6307 0.2140 0.6116 0.8685 0.5311 0.1803 0.5364 0.8520 0.4571 0.1551
∗ c =( 1+ρ)4
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Table 6: Alienation and identiﬁcation – LIS Wave 4
α = 0 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
Country Gini ¯ ιc
∗ ¯ ι · c
∗ P ¯ ιc
∗ ¯ ι · c
∗ P ¯ ιc
∗ ¯ ι · c
∗ P ¯ ιc
∗ ¯ ι · c
∗ P
as94 0.3078 0.8479 0.9324 0.7906 0.2433 0.7383 0.8949 0.6607 0.2033 0.6550 0.8715 0.5708 0.1757 0.5894 0.8560 0.5046 0.1553
be97 0.2496 0.8872 0.9307 0.8257 0.2061 0.8082 0.8903 0.7196 0.1796 0.7493 0.8643 0.6476 0.1616 0.7032 0.8465 0.5953 0.1486
cn94 0.2859 0.8616 0.9290 0.8004 0.2289 0.7618 0.8876 0.6762 0.1934 0.6855 0.8606 0.5899 0.1687 0.6249 0.8415 0.5258 0.1504
cz96 0.2589 0.9016 0.9013 0.8126 0.2104 0.8410 0.8516 0.7162 0.1854 0.8020 0.8230 0.6600 0.1709 0.7768 0.8048 0.6252 0.1618
dk95 0.2532 0.8881 0.9217 0.8185 0.2073 0.8102 0.8812 0.7140 0.1808 0.7519 0.8571 0.6445 0.1632 0.7061 0.8413 0.5940 0.1504
ﬁ95 0.2174 0.9272 0.9092 0.8430 0.1832 0.8854 0.8631 0.7642 0.1661 0.8614 0.8353 0.7195 0.1564 0.8488 0.8164 0.6930 0.1506
fr94 0.2897 0.8810 0.8949 0.7884 0.2284 0.8035 0.8433 0.6776 0.1963 0.7489 0.8142 0.6098 0.1766 0.7087 0.7958 0.5640 0.1634
ge94 0.2649 0.8889 0.9058 0.8052 0.2133 0.8162 0.8539 0.6970 0.1846 0.7666 0.8219 0.6300 0.1669 0.7322 0.8006 0.5862 0.1553
hu94 0.3248 0.8639 0.8860 0.7653 0.2486 0.7773 0.8267 0.6426 0.2087 0.7191 0.7927 0.5700 0.1852 0.6784 0.7717 0.5235 0.1700
is97 0.3371 0.8462 0.9108 0.7708 0.2598 0.7393 0.8665 0.6406 0.2159 0.6599 0.8412 0.5551 0.1871 0.5986 0.8255 0.4941 0.1666
it95 0.3406 0.8448 0.9022 0.7622 0.2596 0.7374 0.8553 0.6308 0.2148 0.6574 0.8290 0.5450 0.1856 0.5953 0.8124 0.4837 0.1647
lx94 0.2352 0.9093 0.9246 0.8407 0.1978 0.8514 0.8806 0.7497 0.1764 0.8135 0.8531 0.6940 0.1633 0.7888 0.8350 0.6587 0.1549
mx96 0.4952 0.8362 0.8411 0.7033 0.3483 0.7354 0.7760 0.5706 0.2826 0.6668 0.7461 0.4975 0.2464 0.6179 0.7309 0.4517 0.2237
nl94 0.2558 0.8819 0.9282 0.8186 0.2094 0.8004 0.8851 0.7084 0.1812 0.7410 0.8567 0.6348 0.1624 0.6964 0.8368 0.5828 0.1491
nw95 0.2403 0.9101 0.9010 0.8200 0.1970 0.8526 0.8541 0.7282 0.1750 0.8135 0.8268 0.6726 0.1616 0.7863 0.8083 0.6356 0.1527
pl95 0.3108 0.8714 0.8822 0.7688 0.2389 0.7864 0.8277 0.6510 0.2023 0.7254 0.7979 0.5788 0.1799 0.6791 0.7794 0.5293 0.1645
rc95 0.2781 0.8838 0.9089 0.8033 0.2234 0.8072 0.8602 0.6944 0.1931 0.7536 0.8310 0.6262 0.1742 0.7147 0.8119 0.5803 0.1614
ru95 0.4497 0.8160 0.8781 0.7165 0.3222 0.6954 0.8205 0.5706 0.2566 0.6092 0.7899 0.4812 0.2164 0.5442 0.7719 0.4200 0.1889
sw95 0.2218 0.9203 0.9036 0.8315 0.1845 0.8783 0.8481 0.7448 0.1652 0.8595 0.8125 0.6984 0.1549 0.8567 0.7883 0.6754 0.1498
uk95 0.3429 0.8508 0.8987 0.7646 0.2622 0.7511 0.8515 0.6396 0.2193 0.6792 0.8267 0.5615 0.1925 0.6250 0.8126 0.5079 0.1741
us94 0.3622 0.8248 0.9196 0.7585 0.2748 0.7005 0.8761 0.6137 0.2223 0.6067 0.8499 0.5157 0.1868 0.5334 0.8330 0.4444 0.1610
∗ c =( 1+ρ)4
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Table 7: p-values for polarization indices, α =0(Gini)
Wave 3 data (a * indicates a p-value ≤ 5%)
cz92 ﬁ91 be92 sw92 nw91 dk92 lx91 ge89 nl91 rc91 pl92 fr89 hu91 it91 cn91 is92 as89 uk91 us91 ru92 mx89
cz92 0.50 0.45 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00*
ﬁ91 0.55 0.50 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00*
be92 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.18 0.02* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00*
sw92 1.00 1.00 0.82 0.50 0.09 0.00* 0.01* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00*
nw91 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.91 0.50 0.09 0.10 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00*
dk92 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.91 0.50 0.35 0.03* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00*
lx91 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.90 0.65 0.50 0.13 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00*
ge89 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.97 0.87 0.50 0.01* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00*
nl91 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.50 0.09 0.05* 0.00* 0.01* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00*
rc91 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.91 0.50 0.22 0.00* 0.04* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00*
pl92 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.95 0.78 0.50 0.05* 0.11 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00*
fr89 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.95 0.50 0.43 0.05* 0.02* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00*
hu91 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.96 0.89 0.57 0.50 0.21 0.18 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00*
it91 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.95 0.79 0.50 0.45 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00*
cn91 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.82 0.55 0.50 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00*
is92 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.24 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00*
as89 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.76 0.50 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00*
uk91 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.41 0.00* 0.00*
us91 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.59 0.50 0.00* 0.00*
ru92 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.00*
mx89 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.504
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Table 8: p-values for polarization indices, α =0 .25
Wave 3 data (a * indicates a p-value ≤ 5%)
cz92 ﬁ91 sw92 be92 nw91 dk92 lx91 ge89 nl91 rc91 pl92 fr89 hu91 cn91 it91 as89 is92 uk91 us91 ru92 mx89
cz92 0.50 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00*
ﬁ91 1.00 0.50 0.02* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00*
sw92 1.00 0.98 0.50 0.09 0.09 0.00* 0.01* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00*
be92 1.00 1.00 0.91 0.50 0.46 0.06 0.06 0.00* 0.00* 0.01* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00*
nw91 1.00 1.00 0.91 0.54 0.50 0.08 0.07 0.00* 0.00* 0.01* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00*
dk92 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.94 0.92 0.50 0.22 0.00* 0.00* 0.04* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.01* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00*
lx91 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.94 0.93 0.78 0.50 0.35 0.31 0.23 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.04* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00*
ge89 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.65 0.50 0.41 0.27 0.03* 0.02* 0.03* 0.03* 0.09 0.04* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00*
nl91 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.69 0.59 0.50 0.30 0.04* 0.03* 0.04* 0.03* 0.10 0.04* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00*
rc91 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.96 0.77 0.73 0.70 0.50 0.33 0.30 0.30 0.27 0.25 0.17 0.05* 0.01* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00*
pl92 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.93 0.97 0.96 0.67 0.50 0.45 0.45 0.40 0.34 0.22 0.03* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00*
fr89 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.94 0.98 0.97 0.70 0.55 0.50 0.50 0.44 0.36 0.25 0.04* 0.01* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00*
hu91 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.93 0.97 0.96 0.70 0.55 0.50 0.50 0.44 0.37 0.25 0.05* 0.01* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00*
cn91 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.94 0.97 0.97 0.73 0.60 0.56 0.56 0.50 0.40 0.29 0.08 0.01* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00*
it91 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.92 0.91 0.90 0.75 0.66 0.64 0.63 0.60 0.50 0.41 0.29 0.11 0.00* 0.00* 0.00*
as89 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.83 0.78 0.75 0.75 0.71 0.59 0.50 0.40 0.16 0.00* 0.00* 0.00*
is92 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.95 0.97 0.96 0.95 0.92 0.71 0.60 0.50 0.10 0.00* 0.00* 0.00*
uk91 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.89 0.84 0.90 0.50 0.00* 0.00* 0.00*
us91 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.02* 0.00*
ru92 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.50 0.00*
mx89 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.504
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Table 9: p-values for polarization indices, α =1
Wave 3 data (a * indicates a p-value ≤ 5%)
ﬁ91 sw92 be92 dk92 nw91 cn91 ge89 as89 us91 lx91 cz92 it91 pl92 fr89 hu91 nl91 rc91 is92 uk91 ru92 mx89
ﬁ91 0.50 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00*
sw92 1.00 0.50 0.02* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00*
be92 1.00 0.98 0.50 0.09 0.09 0.00* 0.01* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00*
dk92 1.00 1.00 0.91 0.50 0.46 0.06 0.06 0.00* 0.00* 0.01* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00*
nw91 1.00 1.00 0.91 0.54 0.50 0.08 0.07 0.00* 0.00* 0.01* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00*
cn91 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.94 0.92 0.50 0.22 0.00* 0.00* 0.04* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.01* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00*
ge89 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.94 0.93 0.78 0.50 0.35 0.31 0.23 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.04* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00*
as89 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.65 0.50 0.41 0.27 0.03* 0.02* 0.03* 0.03* 0.09 0.04* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00*
us91 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.69 0.59 0.50 0.30 0.04* 0.03* 0.04* 0.03* 0.10 0.04* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00*
lx91 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.96 0.77 0.73 0.70 0.50 0.33 0.30 0.30 0.27 0.25 0.17 0.05* 0.01* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00*
cz92 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.93 0.97 0.96 0.67 0.50 0.45 0.45 0.40 0.34 0.22 0.03* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00*
it91 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.94 0.98 0.97 0.70 0.55 0.50 0.50 0.44 0.36 0.25 0.04* 0.01* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00*
pl92 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.93 0.97 0.96 0.70 0.55 0.50 0.50 0.44 0.37 0.25 0.05* 0.01* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00*
fr89 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.94 0.97 0.97 0.73 0.60 0.56 0.56 0.50 0.40 0.29 0.08 0.01* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00*
hu91 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.92 0.91 0.90 0.75 0.66 0.64 0.63 0.60 0.50 0.41 0.29 0.11 0.00* 0.00* 0.00*
nl91 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.83 0.78 0.75 0.75 0.71 0.59 0.50 0.40 0.16 0.00* 0.00* 0.00*
rc91 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.95 0.97 0.96 0.95 0.92 0.71 0.60 0.50 0.10 0.00* 0.00* 0.00*
is92 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.89 0.84 0.90 0.50 0.00* 0.00* 0.00*
uk91 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.02* 0.00*
ru92 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.50 0.00*
mx89 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.504
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Figure 6: Estimated Densities for the U.S. and U.K., Wave 34
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Figure 7: Estimated Densities for the U.S. and the Czech Republic, Wave 3